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THE CHANGING FACE OF RECOGNITION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A CASE STUDY OF TIBET 
Robert D. Sloane* 
The United States recognizes the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR)—hereinafter referred to as “Tibet”—to be 
part of the People’s Republic of China.  The 
preservation and development of Tibet’s unique 
religious, cultural, and linguistic heritage and 
protection of its people’s fundamental human rights 
continue to be of concern. 
—U.S. Department of State1 
INTRODUCTION 
The above quotation appears in the chapter of the U.S. 
Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices that reviews the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).  Its two sentences stand in a strange relationship to 
one another: the first affirms that Tibet is a “part of” 
China;2 the second, however, acknowledges that Tibetans 
 
 * Law Clerk, Hon. Robert D. Sack, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; 
J.D. Yale Law School, 2000.  From 2000 to 2001, the author worked, under the 
auspices of Yale Law School’s Robert L. Bernstein Fellowship in International 
Human Rights, for the Tibet Justice Center (formerly the International Committee 
of Lawyers for Tibet); he presently serves as a member of the Board of Directors.  
The views expressed here, however, are personal and do not necessarily represent 
those of the Tibet Justice Center.  The author acknowledges with gratitude the 
invaluable comments and suggestions of W. Michael Reisman, Gregory H. Fox, and 
Elizabeth Brundige. 
 1 U.S. Dep’t of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office, Feb. 25, 2001). 
 2 It also corroborates China’s official position that the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR), the central region of the geographic Tibetan plateau that corresponds roughly 
to the former Tibetan provinces of “Ü” and “Tsang” is Tibet.  See INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION OF JURISTS, TIBET: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 49 (1997) 
[hereinafter INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS].  China incorporated the eastern regions of 
Tibet, the former Tibetan provinces of Amdo and Kham, into the present Chinese 
provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan, and Sichuan.  Id.  See also TIBET 
INFORMATION NETWORK & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, CUTTING OFF THE 
SERPENT’S HEAD, TIGHTENING CONTROL IN TIBET 1994-1995 1 & n.1 (1996) (noting 
that Hugh Richardson, the last British representative to Tibet, described 
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are not Chinese.  Put differently, while the U.S.  State 
Department recognizes Tibet as part of the Chinese state 
(the PRC), it at the same time recognizes that Tibetans are 
not now—and never have been—a subset of the Chinese 
people.  This difference is critical.  At least since World War 
II, the decline of imperial empires, and decolonization, the 
theoretical bedrock of governmental legitimacy has resided 
in the self-determination of peoples.3  Yet governmental 
practices of recognition have not always followed suit.  In 
principle, states should recognize exclusively legitimate 
governments, those that exercise authority on the basis of 
democratic institutions that effectuate their peoples right to 
self-determination; in practice, states more often recognize 
governments as a matter of political expedience or to 
further their diplomatic and economic agenda. 
But recognition no longer remains the exclusive province 
of sovereign states.  Today, the international stage includes 
a number of non-state, quasi-state, and transnational 
actors that exert varying degrees of influence over 
 
“ethnographic Tibet” as encompassing all of the TAR, as well as the Tibetan-
inhabited regions of the neighboring Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, 
and Yunnan). 
 3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General 
Assembly Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 16, 1976, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (“[A]ll peoples have the 
right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the 
duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the [U.N.] Charter.”).  
The meaning of the “self-determination of peoples” forms the subject of long-
standing debate.  E.g., Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: 
A New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 733, 736-56 (1995) (reviewing competing 
conceptions of the “self” entitled to determination); see also Ved P. Nanda, Self-
Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 257 (1981); Lung-chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in 
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. 
Weston eds., 1976). 
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recognition practices; for example, international 
institutions and organizations, such as the European 
Parliament and the Organization of American States; non-
governmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, 
the Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization, and 
the International Commission of Jurists; and, not least, the 
United Nations, which is not a single actor but a blanket 
label subsuming multiple organs and institutions, many of 
which issue judgments, resolutions, and declarations of 
recognition.  Moreover, because most modern democracies 
manifest a separation of powers—dispersing legislative, 
executive, and judicial authority—these institutions, too, do 
not always agree with one another.  Conflicting recognition 
judgments therefore can sometimes arise within a state.  
Tibet is a case in point.  The State Department recognizes 
Tibet as “part of” China.4  Congress disagrees: Tibet is a 
sovereign state under illegal foreign occupation.  Its “true 
representatives . . . continue to be His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.”5 
Inevitably, non-state decisions (and conflicting decisions 
within a state) to recognize, or withhold recognition from, 
another putative state or government do not always 
conform to the more expedient determinations of 
sovereigns.  Broadly speaking, for analytic purposes, we 
might distinguish three forms of recognition: first, political 
recognition, the formal acts by which one sovereign 
recognizes another’s claim to statehood or legitimate 
governance;6 second, legal recognition, a judgment of 
 
 4 U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 1. 
 5 S. Res.169, 104th Cong. (1995).  See also Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title V, § 536, 108 Stat. 481 (1994) 
(“Congress has determined that Tibet is an occupied sovereign country under 
international law.”); Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 
1993, Pub. L. No. 102-138, Title III, §355, 105 Stat. 647 (1991) (expressing the view 
of Congress that “Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese 
provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, is an occupied country under the 
established principles of international law”). 
 6 While some dispute its utility, it is commonplace to draw a distinction between 
the recognition of states and that of governments.  I intend both here, though I 
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recognition based on some set of reasonably objective legal 
criteria;7 and third, civil recognition, the force of popular 
moral opinion, as expressed by civil society through its 
representative institutions, both governmental and non-
governmental.  An unjustly denied claim to legal 
recognition often, but not always, animates civil 
recognition. 
These forms of recognition can, and frequently do, 
overlap, but sometimes they do not.  The resulting conflict 
need not present a problem.  Realistically, a sovereign’s 
conduct of foreign relations at times demands political 
recognition absent either or both legal and civil recognition.  
Few today, for example, seriously advocate withdrawing 
recognition from the present Chinese government, even 
though its one-party dictatorship makes an ongoing 
mockery of the right of China’s 1.3 billion citizens to any 
genuine form of democracy or self-determination.  But it 
remains desirable, to the extent practicable, for sovereigns 
to conform political judgments of recognition to principled 
judgments of legitimacy.  This encourages the gradual 
internalization of democratic norms of governance and 
respect for international human rights.8  The problem with 
failing to distinguish political recognition from recognition 
based on legal and civil legitimacy is that, over time, the 
former begins to obscure the latter.  Political recognition 
 
distinguish the traditional criteria for each below.  See Part I. infra. 
 7 See JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 45 (1987).  
Thomas D.  Grant suggests that in modern international law the distinction between 
“recognition conceived as a legal act and recognition conceived as a political act” is 
one of two critical “axes” along which the “critical tension in recognition law is 
concentrated . . . .”  THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND 
PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND EVOLUTION, at xx (1999). 
 8 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997) (arguing that nations obey, not merely conform their 
behavior to, international law in large measure because of a gradual evolutionary 
process “of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms”) 
(reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS 
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)). 
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confers a venire of legitimacy on governments and states.  
To be sure, foreign relations may always require acts that 
imply sovereign recognition of illegitimate governments and 
states.  But in the long term, formal political recognition 
tends to reinforce civil—and ultimately even legal—
perceptions of legitimacy.  To conflate these forms of 
recognition can therefore perpetuate manifest injustices. 
This Article explores this phenomenon through the case 
of Tibet, a paradigmatic example.  Tibet possesses 
legitimate claims to both statehood and a government based 
upon an act of self-determination by the Tibetan people.  
The international community’s practices toward Tibet 
exemplify certain nascent changes in recognition practices, 
but at the same time, they also concededly underscore the 
extent to which recognition remains a quintessential 
political act.9  Tibet’s history, however, shows that the 
failure to distinguish different forms of recognition can at 
times generate injustices greater than the needs of political 
expedience. 
Part I reviews the theory of recognition relative to states 
and governments.  It points out ambiguities in these 
debates and concludes by emphasizing the importance of 
distinguishing the normative from the descriptive aspects of 
recognition practices—of separating political, legal, and 
civil recognition.  Part II appraises Tibet’s statehood from 
the perspective of each of these forms of recognition; in 
particular, it examines the historical and legal sources of 
the present tensions surrounding Tibet’s international 
status.  Part III then analyzes the concomitant question of 
recognition practices toward the Tibetan government-in-
exile, arguably the most resilient government-in-exile in 
history—again distinguishing between political, legal, and 
civil recognition.  I conclude by indicating how the failure to 
distinguish these different forms of recognition contributes 
to the atrophy of Tibet’s rightful claim to statehood, self-
 
 9 Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938). 
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determination, and democratic governance; and by 
advocating efforts to distinguish political from legal and 
civil recognition in future discourse.  The latter two should 
continue to promote evolving, even if still aspirational, 
norms of democracy10 and the right of peoples to self-
determination.11 A change in state practice along the lines 
sketched here would represent a small but critical step 
toward vindicating Tibet’s legitimate claim to national 
sovereignty and a freely determined government.  More 
generally, it may prevent the “self-determination of 
peoples” from disintegrating into an empty relic of the era 
of decolonization.12 
I. RECOGNITION:  LEGAL CRITERIA, POLITICAL DISCRETION, AND 
CIVIL LEGITIMACY 
The concept of recognition in international law is 
notoriously murky.13 Arguments about recognition typically 
distinguish between the recognition of states and 
governments.  Failure to separate the two analytically, 
according to many commentators, contributes to confusion 
 
 10 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 
AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992); see also Letter dated 17 December 1996 from the Secretary 
General addressed to the President of the General Assembly, Dec. 20, 1996, U.N. Doc. 
A/51/761 (1996) (expressing support for democratization and setting forth an agenda 
to promote the restoration of democracy). 
 11 See generally DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory 
H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).  Self-determination and democratic governance 
are distinct, but intimately related, modern norms, for “[s]elf-determination 
postulates the right of a people organized in an established territory to determine its 
collective political destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore at the core of the 
democratic entitlement.”  Franck, supra note 10, at 52. 
 12 See Franck, supra note 10, at 52-60 (surveying the evolution of the principle of 
self-determination of peoples and its principal application to “colonies,” as distinct 
from “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities”).  This distinction is critical because, 
as I emphasize below, it makes legal rights depend, as they often do, on a factual 
characterization, namely, whether we describe the relevant people as a “colony” or a 
“minority.”  See text accompanying notes 74 to 76 infra. 
 13 See STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE 21 (1998). 
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about what criteria, if any, truly circumscribe the practice 
of recognition in international law.14  But at the same time, 
other scholars fault this view because, in practice, it is 
virtually impossible not to conflate them: “[T]he existence of 
an effective and independent government,” Brownlie writes, 
“is the essence of statehood, and, significantly, recognition 
of states may take the form of recognition of a 
government.”15  This view may be overstated.  Certainly, 
criteria of recognition traditionally determinative of 
statehood include some form of government; and conversely, 
recognition of a government (usually) implies a 
corresponding territory and population that it governs. 
But as Roth argues, the oft-repeated maxim that “just as 
there is no government without a state, there is no state 
without a government” fails to acknowledge that “statehood 
is a normative and not an empirical fact.”16  A state does not 
necessarily cease if its government descends into chaos or 
an invading army conquers its territory.17  To date, for 
example, states continue to recognize the state of Somalia 
despite the complete collapse of its government.  But they 
adamantly refuse to recognize Somaliland, the putative 
state comprised of a relatively stable region of Somalia—
despite the fact that it arguably enjoys a functioning, 
effective government.  In Afghanistan, by contrast, even 
though the Taliban’s government exercised effective control 
 
 14 E.g., DUGARD, supra note 7, at 6 (“[B]oth writers and courts have failed to 
distinguish adequately between the recognition of States and of governments—a 
confusion that has contributed substantially to the prevailing uncertainty in the law 
of recognition.”).  Compare GRANT, supra note 7, with M.J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION 
OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE, 1815-1995 (1997). 
 15 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (5th ed. 1998); 
see also P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 36, 106 
(1994) (suggesting that a decision not to afford a government recognition is futile 
and equating recognition of a state with recognition of its government).  Some 
scholars, in fact, treat state and governmental recognition “as a single legal process.”  
PETERSON, supra note 14, at 2. 
 16 BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 
(1999) (emphasis added). 
 17 Id. at 130-31. 
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over the vast majority of its territory, most governments 
refused recognition to its extremist regime.  No one 
claimed, however, that the State of Afghanistan had 
vanished from the map.  Both states and governments, 
then, depend to a significant degree on normative 
judgments by international actors.  Neither is purely 
descriptive.  This does not mean that practices of 
recognition toward both are not—or ought not to be—
governed by criteria more principled than realpolitik.  It 
does mean, however, that legal and moral criteria will only 
shape and perhaps circumscribe practices of recognition; it 
will rarely, if ever, dictate them. 
Moreover, to shift from consideration of what criteria 
govern recognition to who today employs these criteria 
reveals a potential for civil society to bring state practices of 
recognition into greater conformity with principles of 
legitimacy, defined broadly by norms of democratic 
governance and self-determination.  States will remain for 
the foreseeable future the paramount actors whose 
judgments of recognition relative to other putative 
governments and states matter.18  But the views of civil 
society have tangible effects.  First, they exert a not 
insignificant influence on states directly; and second, by 
their judgments, they help to shape the normative criteria 
of recognition employed by states.  This section analyzes the 
traditional debates surrounding the international legal 
criteria of recognition as applied to states and governments.  
It also takes brief note of developments in recognition 
practices toward governments that occupy and colonize 
territory by military force—evinced not only by hortatory 
scholarship but by state practice, judicial decisions, and 
transnational processes.  In general, these developments 
give greater primacy to considerations of democratic 
legitimacy and respect for international human rights.  It 
would be counterproductive to ignore the constraints of 
 
 18 See LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 25 (2d. ed. 2000). 
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politics and international diplomacy.  But these 
developments in the law of recognition—and the principles 
that animate them—should not be dismissed; they 
constitute paramount long-term objectives of recognition 
practices in relation to both states and governments. 
A. Recognition of States 
Recognition of states revolves around the somewhat 
hackneyed debate between the “declaratory” and 
“constitutivist” schools,19 loosely associated with legal 
idealism and legal positivism, respectively.20 The 
declaratory model typically begins with the criteria 
enunciated in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States.21  Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention 
stipulates that a state’s international legal personality 
requires “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into 
relations with other states.”22  These criteria imply, 
respectively, a stable community, occupying a reasonably 
well-defined territory, administered by a competent 
government, which is capable of entering into relations with 
 
 19 For the canon on this debate, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979); PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE BIRTH OF NATIONS (1974); H. 
LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947); Hans Kelsen, 
Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 605 
(1941). 
 20 DUGARD, supra note 7, at 7-8.  But see ROTH, supra note 16, at 124 
(associating the constitutive view with the “positivist” conception that law among 
nations arises exclusively from sovereign consent).  This inconsistency results from 
the different meanings each author ascribes to “positivism.”  The former appears to 
refer to positivism in the superficial sense that some legal rules or criteria govern 
the practice of recognition.  The latter means by “positivism” that all law—national 
and international—emanates from a sovereign source; and the constitutivist position 
appears to comport better with this view because the germane “sovereign” consists of 
the group of nations that extend recognition to a putative state.  See ROTH, supra 
note 16, at 124. 
 21 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 
reprinted in 28 AM. J. INT’L L. Supp. 75 (1934) [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. 
 22 Id. art. 1. 
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other states.23  Possession of each criterion may not be 
indispensable; nor, by the same token, does possession of 
all, ipso facto, establish statehood.24  Under the Montevideo 
Convention, however, their existence creates a presumption 
in favor of statehood.  The declaratory model therefore 
regards recognition as a “declaration” of a legal matter of 
fact, i.e., the existence of an entity that meets the criteria 
that define statehood.25 
The competing view, the constitutivist model, regards 
statehood as entirely contingent on recognition by 
preexisting states.26  Forcefully stated, “A State is, and 
becomes, an International Person through recognition only 
and exclusively.”27  The virtues of this view are twofold: 
First, it appears to comport better with the traditional 
conception of international law as “jus gentium 
voluntarium—nothing more than voluntary or consensual 
behavior, manifest in the practice of states.”28  And to the 
extent that recognition is an issue of customary 
international law—which axiomatically requires state 
practice and opinio juris—it is unclear how any plausible 
theory of recognition could ignore trends in state practice, 
regardless of whether these trends “declare” or “constitute” 
putative states.  Second, an entity that lacks recognition by 
other states remains, in practice, a non-entity.29  This is 
because the inquiry into statehood reduces in practice to 
questions about whether an entity does or should enjoy the 
incidents of statehood; and these questions, in turn, depend 
on whether existing states choose to extend these 
 
 23 See BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 71. 
 24 Id. at 70. 
 25 See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 7, at 4-6; Charter of the Organization of American 
States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 12, 2 U.S.T. 2394 (“The political existence of the State is 
independent of recognition by other States.”). 
 26 See GRANT, supra note 7, at 2-4. 
 27 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 71, at 125 (8th ed. 1955)).  
See also Kelsen, supra note 19, at 608. 
 28 GRANT, supra note 7, at 3. 
 29 Biafra’s unsuccessful secession is a case in point.  See David Ijalaye, Was 
“Biafra” at Any Time a State in International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 551 (1971). 
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privileges.  For this reason, the constitutivist model may at 
first blush appear more pragmatic than the declaratory 
model.30 
Despite this, the “predominant view of recognition among 
international law scholars, officials and courts today is the 
declaratory view,”31 a state of affairs that Roth ascribes to 
the declaratory model’s greater amenability to international 
adjudication and scholarship.32  Many scholars also fault 
constitutivism as unduly political; it relegates recognition to 
the “unfettered political will” of existing states—pure 
realpolitik.33  Moreover, as a legal matter, the constitutive 
model begs a host of difficult theoretical questions.  To 
assert that “recognition is a precondition of the existence of 
legal rights” raises questions about (i) how many states 
must recognize a putative state before it becomes a “real” 
state; (ii) whether it then exists only for states that have 
expressed recognition, formally or informally (e.g., by 
engaging in diplomatic relations); and (iii) whether 
recognition must be based on “adequate knowledge of the 
facts” or is instead purely discretionary.34  The constitutivist 
view also appears to conflict with state practice in at least 
two respects: First, while unrecognized territorial 
communities are not states, neither are they terra nullius; 
as a community, they enjoy some rights associated with 
international legal personality.  Second, courts tend to give 
legal effect to acts of recognized states that antedate 
recognition, a trend in tension with the notion that the 
entity lacked statehood prior to its recognition by other 
states.35  At the theoretical level, finally, to reduce the 
 
 30 See PETERSON, supra note 14, at 20 (noting that states are “abstract entities” 
that must act through agents, namely, governments, which “retain [a] legal 
monopoly on speaking and acting for their state”). 
 31 ROTH, supra note 16, at 126; PETERSON, supra note 14, at 23 (“By 1975, the 
vast majority of specialists accepted the declaratory theory.”). 
 32 ROTH, supra note 16, at 127; PETERSON, supra note 14, at 25 (noting the 
adoption of the declaratory model by national courts). 
 33 GRANT, supra note 7, at 19. 
 34 BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 89. 
 35 See GRANT, supra note 7, at 20-22. 
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international law of recognition to a pure matter of political 
will eviscerates its status as law.  Roth therefore rightly 
emphasizes that “some concession to the realpolitik of 
international relations is essential if international law is to 
be taken seriously as a framework for actual state 
behavior;” but at the same time, “establishment of a 
meaningful international law of peace and security requires 
the collective denial of recognition of the fruits of illegal 
acts; otherwise, violations of international law are 
permitted to create rights in international law.”36 
Resolution of the declaratory-constitutivist debate is not 
the focus of this Article.  For present purposes, however, 
despite the novel issues raised by international incidents 
since its publication a half-century ago, the views expressed 
by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in his seminal work37 continue to 
capture, broadly speaking, the need for a balance between, 
on the one hand, acknowledging the role of politics in state 
practices of recognition, and on the other, maintaining the 
premise that recognition is partly a legal—and not solely a 
political—act.  Lauterpacht wrote: 
[R]ecognition consists in the application of a rule of 
international law by way of ascertaining the existence 
of the requisite conditions of statehood; and (b) . . . 
fulfilment of that function in the affirmative sense—
and nothing else—brings into being the plenitude of 
the normal rights and duties which international law 
attaches to statehood.38 
This view also has the virtue—today, as in the immediate 
post-War era—of “approximating most closely to the 
practice of States and to a working juridical principle . . . .”39  
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law adopts a 
 
 36 ROTH, supra note 16, at 125. 
 37 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17. 
 38 Id. at 73; see also CHEN, supra note 16, at 40-41. 
 39 LAUTHERPACHT, supra note 17, at 73. 
SLOANE.DOC 2/9/2005  2:00 PM 
2002] A CASE STUDY OF TIBET 119 
 
similar compromise, noting that a state need not extend 
formal recognition to any state but is “required” to treat as 
a state any entity that fulfills the conventional Montevideo 
criteria.40 
Tellingly, however, when jurists address recognition, 
often it is not the existence of a state that is at issue, but 
rather the specific incidents of statehood—for example, the 
capacity to enter into agreements with other states.  Yet the 
incidents of statehood are relevant principally in relation to 
governmental recognition.41  While scholars often cite the 
famous Tinoco Arbitration42 as juridical support for the 
declaratory model of statehood,43 former Chief Justice 
William Howard Taft’s opinion was not about the existence 
of Costa Rica (a state); it addressed the validity of the 
Tinoco regime (a government)—more precisely, that 
government’s capacity to enter into agreements that could 
bind successive governments of Costa Rica.  This again 
underscores the practical difficulty in efforts to delink state 
from governmental recognition.  For analytic and normative 
purposes, however, this should not dissuade efforts to avoid 
simple conflation of the two.  For clearly, just as some 
states are not properly so-called despite fulfilling the 
 
 40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 202 (1987). 
 41 See CHEN, supra note 18, at 40 (noting that the “great majority of recognition 
problems involve recognition of regimes as the governments of already recognized 
states without affecting the continuity of legal identity of the states”).  The incidents 
of statehood need not exist in an all-or-nothing state.  Taiwan remains perhaps the 
best example of a territory that enjoys many, but not all, of the incidents of 
statehood.  Indeed, it is precisely those incidents that appear to China to constitute a 
“declaration” of independent statehood that threatens to spark cross-strait tensions.  
See generally Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait 
Relations Between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453 (2000). 
 42 Tinoco Concessions (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rico), 1 R.I.A.A. 369 (1923) (recognizing 
the governmental legitimacy of—and, consequently, the continuity of the duties and 
obligations assumed by—a coup-based government in Costa Rica that subsisted for 
several years, on the ground that during this time it satisfied the “effective control” 
test then prevailing as the standard by which to assess the legitimacy of 
governments). 
 43 See GRANT, supra note 7, at 47.  But see Certain German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 25) (implying support for the 
constitutive theory of state recognition). 
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conventional criteria for statehood, some governments, 
appraised by contemporary international norms of 
legitimacy, are not properly so-called despite the existence 
of a state they purport to govern and the effective control 
they exercise—often by virtue of the military—over that 
state’s population. 
B. Recognition of Governments 
To specify legal criteria for governmental recognition 
proves even more theoretically difficult, for two principal 
reasons: the debate over whether governmental recognition 
is indeed a legal question at all (or whether, by contrast, it 
is properly understood as purely political); and second, the 
question of the meaning of “recognition.”  Recognition 
generally lies within the discretion of sovereigns.  Most 
scholars and statesman agree that international law does 
not provide unequivocal criteria that establish a duty of 
recognition under certain circumstances.  The conventional 
view is that “[r]ecognition, as a public act of state, is an 
optional and political act and there is no legal duty in this 
regard.”44  Decisions to recognize or refuse recognition to 
governments remain sovereign prerogatives, exercised “in 
accordance with [each state’s] policy objectives and 
ideologies.”45  The Supreme Court adopted this principle 
expressly in Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, in which 
it held that  
[w]hat government is to be regarded here as 
representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political 
 
 44 BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 90 (emphasis in original). 
 45 Yossi Shain, Governments-in-Exile and International Legitimation, in 
GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE 219, 223 (Yossi Shain ed., 1991); see also PETERSON, supra 
note 14, at 72 (noting that, while some governments have employed the “optional 
criteria” consistently, for the most part “optional criteria have been asserted on an 
ad hoc basis appearing more to tailor decisions to the ideological or material 
interests of the recognizing state”). 
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rather than a judicial question, and is to be determined 
by the political department of the government.  
Objections to its determination as well as to the 
underlying policy are to be addressed to it and not to 
the courts.”46   
While evolving principles of international human rights, 
the U.N. Charter’s codification of the principle of non-
aggression,47 and other norms suggest guidelines for 
recognition, it remains true that recognition of governments 
is a quintessential political act, largely unconstrained by 
legal criteria.48 
The second issue is the meaning of recognition as applied 
to governments.  Talmon’s recent study identifies two broad 
potential definitions: first, “willingness or unwillingness on 
the part of the recognizing government to establish or 
maintain official, but not necessarily intimate, relations 
with the government in question”;49 and second, 
“manifestation of the recognizing government’s [subjective] 
opinion on the legal status of the government in question.”50  
 
 46 Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938); see also Pfizer v. Gov’t of 
India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1978); but see Nat’l Petrochem. Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt 
Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he absence of formal recognition cannot 
serve as the touchstone for determining whether the Executive Branch has 
‘recognized’ a foreign nation for the purpose of granting that government access to 
United States courts.”). 
 47 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
 48 At the same time, international organizations have increasingly brokered 
disputes where two putative governments, each claiming to represent the legitimate 
government of a recognized state, seek international recognition.  For example, in 
1997, two parties sought accreditation to represent Cambodia in the General 
Assembly’s fifty-second session, and that body, after receiving a report from its 
credentials committee, ultimately resolved the dispute on the basis of a majority 
vote.  See U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 3, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/52/719 (1997).  For 
a review of this incident and a discussion of the above phenomenon generally, see 
Suellen Ratliff, Comment, U.N. Representation Disputes: A Case Study of Cambodia 
and a New Accreditation Proposal for the Twenty-First Century, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1207 
(1999). 
 49 TALMON, supra note 13, at 23. 
 50 Id. at 29. 
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These meanings often, but not invariably, coincide.51  In a 
rough way, they correspond to the distinction sometimes 
drawn between de facto and de jure recognition.52  Confusion 
about these and related issues has led some statesmen and 
scholars to advocate abolishing governmental recognition 
on the grounds that it creates more difficulties in 
international law than it solves.53 
These qualifications aside, however, governments have 
historically tended to invoke one of three legal theories 
about governmental recognition.54  First, the traditional 
(and probably still the most widely accepted) approach 
recognizes governments that satisfy the “effective control” 
test set forth in Tinoco: They exercise effective control over 
the territory they purport to govern and possess the 
concomitant ability to fulfill international obligations on its 
behalf.55  In fact, some theorists assert that effective control 
is the sole necessary and legally binding criterion for the 
recognition of governments.  “Reduced to essentials, legal 
scholars’ views and governments’ actions show that there 
has been only one binding rule regarding recognition 
decisions since 1815: control of all or most of the state is the 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for recognition as its 
 
 51 See id. at 33-43 (expounding three prominent situations in which recognition 
in each of these two senses did not coincide—Great Britain’s position with respect to 
the Tinoco regime of Costa Rica; the U.S. government’s treatment of the Bolshevik 
regime in the Soviet Union; and the U.S. and South African governments’ long-
standing refusal to recognize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, 
which seized power in 1975 shortly after gaining independence from Portugal). 
 52 For a comprehensive overview, see id. at 44-111. 
 53 See M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments Should not be Abolished, 77 
AM. J. INT’L L. 31 (1983). 
 54 See Shain, supra note 45, at 223. 
 55 See supra note 42; HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 220 
(1945) (arguing that a national legal order “begins to be valid . . . as soon as it has 
become—on the whole—efficacious; and it ceases to be valid as soon as it loses this 
efficacy”); cf. Michael Reisman, Governments-in-Exile: Notes Toward a Theory of 
Formation and Operation, in GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE, supra note 45, at 238 
(arguing that the “term ‘government-in-exile’ is an oxymoron, for the soi-distant 
government-in-exile does not control territory and, without that . . . cannot discharge 
those international obligations expected of governments”). 
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government.”56  Second, the Estrada Doctrine, promulgated 
by the Mexican government in 1931, refuses as a matter of 
principle to recognize (or not recognize) governments per se.  
According to this view, only states should be accorded 
recognition in international law because governmental 
recognition wrongfully interferes in the domestic affairs of 
sovereign nations.57  In the post-World War II era, many 
governments have adopted a policy that declines formally to 
recognize states.58  But in fact “a ‘recognize only states’ 
policy looks much like the more widely shared practice of 
employing only tacit forms of recognition.”59  Finally, the 
 
 56 PETERSON, supra note 14, at 49; Peterson, supra note 53, at 37 (noting that 
this rule “forbids recognizing before control is shown or continuing to recognize after 
control is lost”); but see Shain, supra note 45, at 224 (noting the continued 
recognition of deposed governments of the Allied Powers, despite their lack of 
“effective control” over their territory during World War II). 
 57 The Estrada doctrine originated in the 1930 statement of Mexican Foreign 
Minister Genaro Estrada that “the Mexican Government is issuing no declarations 
in the sense of grants of recognition, since that nation considers that such a course is 
an insulting practice and one which . . . implies that judgment of some sort may be 
passed upon the internal affairs of those nations by other governments.”  Press 
Statement of Sept. 27, 1930, translated in 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 203 (Supp. 1931).  See 
generally Phillip C. Jessup, Editorial Comment, The Estrada Doctrine, 25 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 719, 723 (1931) (arguing that the “practice of extending recognition to or 
withholding it from de facto governments for reasons other than those governments’ 
factual control of their countries is not conducive to the smooth workings of 
international affairs”). 
 58 See TALMON, supra note 13, at 3 (“A study on the recognition of governments 
in international law may, at first sight, seem rather outdated at a time when more 
and more States declare that their policy is to recognize States, not governments.”); 
see, e.g., Letter from the Swiss Embassy in London to Stefan Talmon, May 12, 1993, 
reprinted in TALMON, supra, at 284-85, Appendix I (affirming that Switzerland’s 
general policy is to recognize States only). 
 59 PETERSON, supra note 14, at 181; see also TALMON, supra note 13, at 3 (stating 
that the adoption of this policy “signifies only a change in the method of according 
recognition, not the abolition of the recognition of governments as such”).  Moreover, 
even governments that purport to have abolished governmental recognition per se 
generally make exceptions that permit them to decline recognition to unacceptable 
regimes or to regimes declared illegitimate by the U.N. Security Council acting 
under its Chapter VII powers.  See PETERSON, supra note 14, at 35.  To date, the 
three principal instances of U.N. mandated “non-recognition” have been toward 
South Africa’s regime in Namibia, Ian Smith’s regime in Rhodesia, and General 
Cedras’ regime in Haiti.  See id. at 177. 
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Tobar Approach60 stipulates that governmental recognition 
should be conditioned on democratic legitimacy: Only 
governments that assume power by means of a free and fair 
electoral process merit recognition.  Again, it is important 
to emphasize that these three theories may be mutually 
incompatible.  None must be adopted as a matter of 
international law.  States employ one or more of these 
approaches to justify decisions to recognize governments.  
But these decisions remain discretionary, often influenced if 
not dictated by foreign policy objectives.61 
In addition, certain “optional criteria,”62 which to varying 
degrees overlap with the above theories, often appear in 
recognition discourse.  These include (i) popular support, 
which means, at a minimum, “acquiescence in the new 
regime’s rule,” and, at the other extreme, affirmative 
endorsement;63 (ii) legitimacy, which means, at a minimum, 
that the regime assumed power by prescribed legal 
methods, whether constitutional procedures, custom, or 
otherwise, and, in its strong form, that the governmental 
regime is legitimate by reference to contemporary 
democratic norms of “consent by the governed;”64 and 
finally, (iii) competence, the ability and willingness to fulfill 
international obligations. 
 
 60 This approach originated in “Carlos R. Tobar’s proposal that legality of origin 
be a criterion for recognition among the American republics.”  PETERSON, supra note 
14, at 58. 
 61 See Shain, supra note 45, at 223.  See also PETERSON, supra note 14, at 74 
(“[G]overnments still insist on the right to select and use certain optional criteria 
even though they are now exercising that right less frequently and in favour of fewer 
criteria.”). 
 62 See generally PETERSON, supra note 14, at 51-76 (detailing the main trends in 
criteria for governmental recognition beyond the widely-accepted necessity that the 
putative government exercise “effective control.”). 
 63 See id. at 52. 
 64 See id. at 57; see also Peterson, supra note 53, at 37 (describing the rise of 
monarchical and democratic legitimism as a basis for recognition decisions in, 
respectively, Europe during the Quadruple alliance era, 1815-1830, and the 
Americas in the early 1900s). 
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Of these “optional” criteria, (iii) is actually just a variant 
on effective control.  It suggests that volition, not just 
ability, to carry out international obligations merits 
consideration.  Popular support, by contrast, is properly 
understood as coterminous with legitimacy; it only makes 
sense to include popular support as a criterion if regimes 
without it are “illegitimate.”  For example, if dynastic 
transfers of power are legitimate, then why extend or 
withhold recognition to a dynastic government based on 
whether its population happens to favor the current 
monarch?  A similar reduction applies to the remaining 
optional criteria that appear in recognition discourse:65 a 
government’s military inde-pendence, the degree of violence 
it employs to seize power, whether it originates by 
procedures in conformity with international law, and the 
degree to which it respects international human rights—all 
of these considerations depend in the main on normative 
postulates about legitimacy. 
Governmental recognition, reduced to its skeletal 
features, therefore appears to be a two-part inquiry: first, 
does the regime exercise effective control over the territory 
it aspires to govern (and perhaps also the volition to fulfill 
international obligations on its behalf); and second, is it 
legitimate? The latter criterion invites many questions, 
foremost, the meaning of legitimacy.  But note that, while 
the effective-control prong of governmental recognition 
speaks to the pragmatics of foreign relations, the legitimacy 
prong need not.  A government could coherently recognize a 
regime’s effective control over some territory—and therefore 
deal with that regime as its de facto government—but at 
the same time not extend the regime formal recognition—
and therefore refuse to validate its de jure claim to 
 
 65 See PETERSON, supra note 14, at 68.  Other less prominent “proposed criteria” 
include independence from foreign military support; respect for other states’ rights; 
the absence of extreme violence in the seizure of power; genesis in accord with 
international law; and respect for human rights.  See id. at 77-85.  Yet all of these 
“have not been invoked by governments very often, and have received only 
occasional attention from legal scholars.”  Id. at 84. 
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legitimacy.66  This idea in part animates the debate over the 
spectrum between so-called de facto and de jure 
recognition.67 
Scholarly discourse on recognition evinces frustration 
with the nebulous criteria for both state and governmental 
recognition.  But the fact that governments use recognition 
for political purposes, rather than extend it solely to 
entities that fulfill clear legal criteria, need not count 
against recognition or counsel its “abolition,” an unlikely 
development in any case.  It does mean, however, that 
international law must pay attention to the normative 
effects of recognition and non-recognition.  International law 
should seek to shape state practice so that the political 
discretion that inevitably will continue to form a major 
component of recognition reinforces, rather than erodes, 
emerging norms of legitimacy—in particular, respect for the 
right of peoples to political self-determination and 
democratic governance. 
C. Recognition’s Two Faces: Separating the Normative from the 
Descriptive 
The concept of recognition, like many issues in 
international law, suffers from a chronic failure to 
distinguish the normative from the descriptive.  The two do 
not, of course, invariably converge, and they serve distinct 
functions in international law.  It is axiomatic that state 
practice and opinio juris comprise the bases for ascertaining 
customary international law.68  But in the context of the law 
 
 66 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 53, at 49 (observing that non-recognition, in a 
international framework that ordinarily “recognizes” governments based on the 
Tinoco criterion of “effective control,” can express severe disapproval with symbolic 
efficacy). 
 67 See TALMON, supra note 13, at 107 (“The granting of express de facto 
recognition ‘only’ to an effective government has been used by States in order to 
indicate that in their opinion the regime in power does not qualify as the State’s 
government or that they are unwilling to treat with it as such.”). 
 68 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 6, 1945, U.S.T.S. 993, 59 
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of recognition—assuming that recognition is at least in part 
a matter of law and not exclusively realpolitik—
commentators tend to focus on the former requirement.  
This is understandable: Day-to-day international relations 
concern state practice far more than the multiplicity of 
opinions of jurists, politicians, international institutions, 
and, to a lesser extent in the modern world order, non-
governmental organizations—in short, those materials that 
scholars frequently consult to ascertain opinio juris. 
But a parochial focus on the political aspects of 
recognition, which I loosely identify with the descriptive 
element of recognition practices, often fails to acknowledge 
that its legal and civil analogues—roughly speaking, the 
normative elements of recognition practices—have in fact 
changed since World War II.  For example, with the 
possible exception of some rogue states (or “states of 
concern,” in former Secretary of State Albright’s memorable 
phrase) most governments now acknowledge that the 
acquisition of territory by military force, a method 
previously deemed valid under international law, will no 
longer be tolerated;69 ex injuria jus non oritur (a right 
cannot originate in an illegal act).70  Second, popular 
sovereignty, once a concept foreign to all but a few Western 
nation-states, now constitutes a paramount normative basis 
for recognition of governmental legitimacy.71  Finally, 
 
Stat. 1031, art.38 (1945). 
 69 See SHARON D. KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF 
TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 218-34 (1996); see also 
BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 78. 
 70 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 202(2) (1987) (“A 
State has an obligation not to recognize or treat as a state an entity that has 
attained the qualifications for statehood as a result of a threat or use of armed force 
in violation of the United Nations Charter.”). 
 71 See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in 
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990); cf. Franck, supra 
note 10.  Recent commentators note “a growing tendency on the part of the 
international community to take actions aimed at restoring democratically elected 
governments that [have] been overthrown or suspended.”  Morton H. Halperin & 
Kristen Lomasney, Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the Record, 9 J. 
DEMOCRACY 134 (No. 2) (April 1998).  The authors note that, since 1993, in Albania, 
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colonization, another predominant and largely accepted 
feature of the pre-World War II era, is clearly no longer 
valid practice under international law.72 
“[A]s the cliché has it, . . . ‘we are all [legal] realists 
now’”73 in a colloquial sense.  We acknowledge that fact-
characterization by decision-makers frequently determines 
“what the law is.”  But we must be careful not to draw the 
wrong conclusion from this observation.  Particularly in the 
context of international law—where determining “what the 
law is” often requires resorting to how state actors construe 
it and, moreover, to what they believe it to be—legal realism 
does not counsel cynicism or apathy.  Rather, it requires 
principled lawyers and statesmen to ascertain, after 
considering those factors that determine “what the law is,” 
how, given an understanding of the influence these factors 
exert, they can shape law into what it ought to be.  As 
Christine M. Chinkin recently wrote: 
“[L]aw is an instrument of civil society” that does not 
belong to governments, whether acting alone or in 
institutional arenas.  Accordingly, when states fail to 
exercise their obligations to ensure justice, civil society 
can and should step in.  To ignore violative conduct is 
to invite its repetition . . . .74 
Civil society must not be discounted simply because the 
topic under consideration is an issue of international law in 
 
Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, and Serbia, the international community intervened to 
restore democracy; that in Burundi, Niger, and Sierra Leone, similar efforts resulted 
in some progress; and that in Belarus, Burma, Cambodia, and Nigeria, such efforts 
failed—at least for the time being.  See id. at 136-45. 
 72 E.g., G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. 
A/8028 (1971). 
 73 Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1997). 
 74 Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comment, Women’s International Tribunal on 
Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 339 (2001) (quoting 
Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE 
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 17, 29 (James Crawford ed., 1988)). 
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which states—and by extension their political elites—
exercise predominant influence.  When governments violate 
the norms embraced by civil society and professed with 
growing frequency in judicial and academic opinions, it is 
critical to ensure that state political elites remain 
accountable for those violations.  Indeed, one of the central 
objectives of the right to freedom of expression is to ensure 
that, in a democratic society, these violations do not remain 
obscured by the veil of political expediency.  With this 
objective in mind, Part II examines the status of Tibet 
under international law and the influence of recognition 
practices—political, legal, and civil—on this status.75 
II. THE STATUS OF THE STATE OF TIBET: 
POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND CIVIL DIMENSIONS 
The U.S. State Department, as noted at the outset of this 
Article, recognizes Tibet as “part of” the People’s Republic of 
China.  But it then emphasizes that “[p]reservation and 
development of Tibet’s unique religious, cultural, and 
linguistic heritage and protection of its people’s 
fundamental human rights continue to be of concern.”76  
This phrasing is not accidental.  As Franck observed in his 
seminal article, The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance, “the [ICCPR] makes an important distinction 
between the right of each nation’s collective polis and the 
rights of minorities within each state . . . .”77  The former 
 
 75 Recent manifestations of “regimes of non-recognition” include state practices 
toward the State Law and Order Council’s government in Myanmar (Burma), the 
Taliban’s government in Afghanistan, and General Raoul Cedras’ government in 
Haiti.  These cases prove less analogous to Tibet’s circumstances, however, because 
they involve internal changes in government, rather than invasion and occupation 
by foreign military forces.  They therefore raise questions about governmental 
legitimacy, but do not serve to illustrate the response of the international 
community to recognition questions that arise when one state purports to 
“incorporate” another; as, for example, in the cases of Indonesia’s invasion of East 
Timor and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
 76 U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 1. 
 77 Franck, supra note 10, at 58. 
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enjoy the right to democratic governance; the latter, only 
the “right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language”78—that is, 
to the preservation of their “religious, cultural and 
linguistic heritage . . . .”  The decision factually to 
characterize the Tibetan people as an “ethnic minority” 
rather than a “national polis” therefore determines their 
theoretical rights under international law.  Like the Clinton 
Administration’s deliberate decision to refer to the 
decimation of the Tutsis in Rwanda as a “civil war” rather 
than a “genocide,”79 the State Department’s characterization 
of Tibet reflects an understanding of the legal consequences 
that might follow from calling a spade a spade. 
Military conquest, at least prior to the twentieth century, 
could confer sovereignty over foreign states.  But today, few 
dispute that “illegal occupation cannot of itself terminate 
statehood.”80  For this reason, the international community 
rightly objected to Iraq’s attempt to annex Kuwait in 1990,81 
to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,82 and 
 
 78 ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 27. 
 79 See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL 
BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 149-54 (1998). 
 80 BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 78; see generally IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963). 
 81 See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 
(1990) (condemning the Iraqi invasion and calling for the immediate withdrawal of 
Iraq’s troops from Kuwait); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/660 (1990) (noting that Iraq “has usurped the authority of the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait” and calling upon member states, inter alia, to refuse to 
recognize any regime established by Iraq); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 
2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990) (calling upon states and international 
organizations “not to recognize [Iraq’s] annexation, and to refrain from any action or 
dealing that might be interpreted as an indirection recognition of the annexation”); 
S.C. Res 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess, 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991) 
(welcoming “the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and  
territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government” and reiterating the 
illegality of Iraq’s “unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait”).  For an analysis of 
the U.N. resolutions passed during the Gulf War, see generally Oscar Schachter, 
United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 452 (1991). 
 82 See G.A. Res. 37, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, 70th plen. mtg. at 17, 
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to Indonesia’s purported annexation of East Timor in 
1975.83  Why then does every state continue to validate 
China’s sovereignty over Tibet, when its only conceivable 
claim, as shown repeatedly by historical and international 
law scholarship, is military annexation? 
The answer is not, as some appear to believe, that Tibet’s 
legal status is “debatable.”84  To my knowledge, without 
exception, every independent scholar who has examined 
this question concluded that Tibet qualified under 
international law as a sovereign state in 1950, the year 
during which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded 
and colonized Tibet.85  Nor can the answer be that time’s 
passage extinguished Tibet’s once valid claim to 
statehood—no more than the passage of twenty-five years 
of Indonesian rule extinguished East Timor’s right to 
statehood.  The unsurprising reason that no state 
recognizes the State of Tibet is that it had the misfortune to 
be invaded by a powerful state and at a time when the 
international community’s attention was diverted 
 
U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980).  As a member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union 
vetoed that organ’s resolution condemning its invasion.  See U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 
2190th mtg. at 57, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2190 (1980). 
 83 See sources cited infra note 256. 
 84 See, e.g., Charney & Prescott, supra note 41, at 456 (“[E]ven if China’s 
sovereignty over Outer Mongolia or Tibet is considered debatable, there does not 
seem to be any basis for arguing that China’s sovereignty over Taiwan in 1894 was 
less than complete.”). 
 85 See, e.g., WARREN SMITH, TIBETAN NATION (1996); MELVYN GOLDSTEIN, A 
HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET, 1913-1951 (1989); MICHAEL C. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, 
THE STATUS OF TIBET: HISTORY, RIGHTS AND PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1987); Dawa Norbu, Selfdetermination [sic] in the Post-Soviet Era: A Case Study of 
Tibet, 34 J. INT’L L. STUD. 237 (1997).  To assert that Tibet qualified as an 
independent state in 1950 does not imply that Tibet was always an independent 
state; nor, however, does it confirm that Tibet was always a part of China.  In fact, 
in a strong sense, both sides of this argument suffer from a categorical mistake.  The 
distinctly modern Western conception of the nation-state, with precise borders and a 
single centralized government, is probably inapposite to pre-twentieth century 
China and Tibet alike.  See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra, at xviii (“The student of 
Tibet’s past legal status inevitably confronts the problem of finding legal categories 
and terms appropriate to describe and define the position of this Central Asian 
country in relation to its neighbors.”). 
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elsewhere, notably to Korea.  Today, China is a nuclear 
power; it exercises a veto as a permanent member of the 
U.N. Security Council; and economically, it has become, 
since the government’s de facto abandonment of socialism,86 
a tremendous potential market that states feel they cannot 
afford to neglect by antagonizing China’s political elite.  
Political realism and economic self-interest, in short, 
motivate states’ formal recognition practices toward China’s 
assertion of sovereignty over Tibet.  It would be foolish to 
deny the influence of these factors.  But in terms of legal 
and civil recognition, Tibet is no more a “part of” China 
than Kuwait was a “part of” Iraq or East Timor a “part of” 
Indonesia.  By reference to legal and civil recognition 
criteria, Tibet remains a sovereign state, at least and until 
China permits the Tibetan people to exercise their right to 
determine freely their political status. 
Today, as the United States struggles to figure out 
exactly what its “one China” policy means,87 one matter 
should be clear: Tibet has no place in it.  The United States, 
other members of the United Nations, regional 
organizations, and the United Nations itself, should 
abandon the fiction that Tibet is “part of” China.  This 
practice lends unnecessary moral authority to the ongoing 
colonial exploitation of Tibet’s land and people.  
International policy must recognize political reality.  To 
ignore it accomplishes nothing and often proves 
counterproductive.  No one at present can or should 
seriously advocate military action to vindicate Tibet’s right 
to statehood.  But this same reality does not necessarily 
 
 86 See generally JASPER BECKER, THE CHINESE (2000) (detailing within each 
strata of Chinese society the gradual transformation of China’s economy to a quasi-
capitalist system since the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping). 
 87 E.g., Taiwan Stands Up, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000, at 23 (noting that while 
the Clinton Administration “sees no reason to change the ‘one China’ policy that has 
guided America’s relations with China for nearly three decades,” Senator Jesse 
Helms and House Representative Tom DeLay, among many others in the Congress, 
reject the notion that this policy dictates appeasement toward China’s threats in 
response to calls for Taiwanese independence). 
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counsel diplomatic appeasement of China’s political elite by 
indulging the fiction that Tibet is “part of” China in every 
national and international fora. 
At the outset of the Cold War, the handful of states with 
knowledge of Tibet’s legal status—Great Britain, India, and 
the United States—were led, largely for ephemeral reasons, 
to indulge this fiction.  But the combination of 
circumstances that precluded genuine consideration of 
Tibet’s right to statehood during the Cold War should not, 
at present, obscure a clear fact: In an era of decolonization, 
Tibet remains the world’s largest colony,88 a state under 
illegal foreign occupation.  The Tibetan people are not one 
of China’s purported fifty-five “national minorities”; they 
are a national polis.  To recognize this fact constitutes an 
essential predicate to enabling the Tibetan people to 
exercise the same right that all colonized peoples have—in 
theory, if not always in practice—enjoyed in the post-War 
era: self-determination. 
The next Part of this Article reviews Tibet’s efforts to 
achieve formal recognition prior to China’s invasion, the 
historical and legal bases that established Tibet’s statehood 
at that time, and the absence of a plausible theory under 
which Tibet lost this status.  My intention here is not to 
attempt an exhaustive analysis of Tibet’s right to 
independence, for the scholarship on this issue is already 
voluminous and, for the most part, unambiguous in its 
conclusions.  Instead, I hope to place the facts 
demonstrative of Tibet’s legal status within a context that 
enables examination of their implications for Tibet’s formal 
recognition in the contemporary world order.  The 
increasing complexity of recognition practices provides 
international actors—both governmental and non-
governmental—with an opportunity gradually to influence 
 
 88 See UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS, TIBET SUPPORT 
GROEP NEDERLAND, & INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, CHINA’S TIBET: THE 
WORLD’S LARGEST REMAINING COLONY (1997). 
SLOANE.DOC 2/9/2005  2:00 PM 
134 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 
 
state practice in an effort to bring political declarations of 
recognition into greater conformity with principled 
judgments of legitimacy.  In the case of Tibet, political 
machinations at the outset of the Cold War precluded its 
formal recognition by state elites.  Tibet failed to secure 
recognition at the United Nations, and this left its 
government with little choice but to negotiate with Beijing.  
Negotiations culminated in a coercive and fraudulent treaty 
that nominally extinguished Tibet’s statehood.  But under 
international law, neither China’s 1950 invasion nor Tibet’s 
alleged accession to this treaty accomplished this.  Tibet, no 
less than—indeed, far more than—the former colonies of 
Western Europe, possessed a legitimate claim to statehood 
in 1950.  That claim remains valid today.  It perpetuates a 
discord between, on the one hand, Tibet’s legal and civil 
recognition, and on the other, its political recognition. 
The political machinations that led state elites formally to 
recognize China’s sovereignty over Tibet during the Cold 
War, however, no longer justify this disconnect.  By 
continuing to denominate Tibet a “part of” China, the 
international community and its constituent states validate 
China’s military conquest, annexation, and colonization of 
Tibet.89  By contrast, to recognize the existence of the State 
of Tibet would be a—perhaps small, but symbolically 
important and politically realistic—step toward restoring to 
the Tibetan people their fundamental right to self-
determination. 
 
 89 See generally id.  See also TIBET INFORMATION NETWORK, CHINA’S GREAT 
LEAP WEST (2000) (reviewing exhaustively the colonial activities that China recently 
established as a matter of national policy in its recent proclamation of the “Western 
Development” campaign in Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjiang)). 
SLOANE.DOC 2/9/2005  2:00 PM 
2002] A CASE STUDY OF TIBET 135 
 
A. Tibet at the United Nations: The Struggle to Secure Political 
Recognition 
“Tibet’s story,” wrote journalist John Avedon in 1979, “is 
that of an ancient nation hurled into the twentieth century 
by the loss of its sovereignty.”90  Prior to the early 
twentieth-century, Tibet’s geographic isolation, coupled 
with the religious aristocracy’s parochial resistance to social 
reform,91 led naturally to political isolation.92  Indeed, until 
threatened by the military momentum of the PLA, which 
defeated Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT in 1949, Tibet’s foreign 
relations were limited largely to Great Britain, India (itself 
a British colony until August 15, 1947), Russia, and China.93  
Between 1913 and 194794 Tibet had a unique opportunity to 
emerge definitively as a modern nation-state, but its “elite 
chose to remain oblivious to what was going on around 
them,” reflecting their resistance to any political change 
 
 90 JOHN F. AVEDON, IN EXILE FROM THE LAND OF SNOWS, at xiii (1979). 
 91 See TSERING SHAKYA, DRAGON IN THE LAND OF SNOWS 5 (1999). 
 92 See AVEDON, supra note 90, at 19; VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 26-
46 (explaining Tibet’s attempts to remain closed to foreign trade and exchanges in 
the late colonial period).  The Dalai Lama wrote that “deliberate isolation” best 
describes pre-twentieth century Tibet.  TENZIN GYATSO, MY LAND AND MY PEOPLE 
38 (1962). 
 93 Tibet’s relationship with China stretches back to the ninth century, when the 
Tibetan Empire (first unified by Songtsen Gampo in the seventh century) signed a 
treaty with the Tang dynasty.  See Sino-Tibet Treaty of 821/823 A.D., reprinted in 
VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 287.  The academic debate over Tibet’s 
historical independence from China, however, focuses largely on the cho-yun 
(“priest-patron”) relationship that Tibet established with the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty 
in the thirteenth century.  This relationship reemerged during China’s prolonged 
domination by the Manchu Ch’ing dynasty (1611-1911). 
 94 This period, in which Tibet enjoyed de facto (and arguably de jure) 
independence as a nation-state, extends roughly from the signing of the Simla 
Convention of 1914 to the date upon which India gained independence, thus 
extinguishing Great Britain’s interest in maintaining Tibet as a region unvarnished 
by Chinese sovereignty.  See Convention Between Great Britain, China, and Tibet 
(Simla Convention), July 3, 1914, Gr. Brit.-China-Tibet, art. 2, reprinted in VAN 
WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 322-25, 323 (recognizing Tibet’s “territorial 
integrity,” the legitimate administration of Tibet by the Dalai Lama’s government in 
Lhasa, and stating that both Great Britain and China, respectively, undertake “not 
to convert Tibet into a Chinese province” and “not to annex Tibet or any portion of 
it”). 
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perceived to threaten their traditional sociopolitical 
predominance.95  Consequently, in 1949, after the PLA 
emerged victorious from China’s civil war, “Tibet was not 
equipped to oppose China either militarily or socially.”96  
Ironically, the isolation Tibet’s government had self-
consciously cultivated to shield Tibet from foreign 
domination proved the principal reason that Tibet found 
itself unable to achieve political recognition as a modern 
nation-state—and thus powerless to resist foreign 
domination by communist China. 
In 1950, most constituents of the nascent United Nations 
remained entirely ignorant of Tibet’s status.  To the extent 
that Tibet’s status occupied them at all, they remained 
content to defer to the views of India, Britain, and the 
United States, the sole states able to speak authoritatively 
on the status of Tibet—with the obvious exception of China, 
which, needless to say, maintained, then as now, that Tibet 
is its internal affair,97 solely within its domestic 
jurisdiction.98  But India, Britain, and the United States 
refused, for ephemeral diplomatic reasons, to support 
formal consideration of Tibet’s status at the United Nations 
directly.  Nor would they corroborate publicly what they 
acknowledged privately: Tibet was a sovereign state 
threatened imminently by communist Chinese aggression. 
In a pattern that became familiar in retrospect, the 
United States government, though internally supportive of 
Tibet, deferred to Great Britain, which, “[a]part from India, 
who for historical and geo-political reasons was most 
 
 95 SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 5. 
 96 Id. 
 97 While Mao Zedong’s government was the first twentieth-century Chinese 
regime capable of asserting this claim militarily, China had, since independence 
from the Manchus in 1911, asserted historical “ownership” of Tibet.  See Sun Yat-
Sen, Lecture (Jan. 27, 1924), in SUN YAT-SEN: HIS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEALS 
163 (Lenoard Shihlien Hsü trans. & ed. 1933); see also CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHINA’S 
DESTINY 11 (1947) (asserting that Tibet’s “allegiance to China dates back to the Sui 
and Tang Dynasties”). 
 98 See U.N. CHART., art. 2, para. 7. 
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directly affected by the Chinese invasion, . . . was the only 
nation [that] had substantial knowledge and historical 
contact with Tibet.”99  Britain, in turn, deferred to the newly 
independent government of India, which it viewed as the 
inheritor of any strategic interests in may once have 
maintained in Tibet.  But India declined to take a firm 
stance on Tibet because it feared to provoke China with any 
act that might exacerbate their already tenuous 
relationship.  This pattern emerged before the Korean War, 
but that conflict reinforced and entrenched it.  India, in 
particular, found itself involved in mediation efforts in 
Korea and feared complicating these delicate negotiations 
by antagonizing China with forthright support for Tibet.  
Consequently, at a critical juncture, “there were no major 
powers prepared to support Tibet’s appeal to the UN;” and 
the State of Tibet “faded into obscurity.”100 
1. The Attempt to Secure International Support for Formal 
Recognition 
In 1949, Tibet’s government struggled desperately to 
modernize, a process hampered by internal political 
struggles.101  At this stage, however, it finally realized that, 
without a modern military, only international recognition 
could protect its sovereignty.  It therefore sought to secure 
recognition by the United Nations.102  By then, the 
imminence of the Chinese threat had become clear to the 
Kashag (the Tibetan cabinet), and as the Dalai Lama 
recalled in his autobiography, “Tibet had neither the 
material resources nor the arms or men to defend its 
 
 99 SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 54. 
 100 Id. at 61. 
 101 See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 85 (providing a detailed historical 
analysis of Tibetan political crises in the pre-War era). 
 102 While the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who struggled to modernize Tibet in the 
1920s, “had contemplated joining the League of Nations, . . . fear of having to open 
the country to outsiders had prevented [Tibet’s rulers] from seeking membership.”  
SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 53. 
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integrity against serious attack . . . .”103  In December of 
1949, the Kashag solicited Great Britain, the sole Western 
state with whom it had maintained significant formal 
relations in the past, to support Tibet’s bid for U.N. 
membership.  A telegram to the British Foreign Office 
stated: 
As all the world knows that Tibet and Communist 
China cannot have any common sympathy by reason of 
religion and principles of life which are just the 
opposite, therefore in order to defend our country 
against impending threat of Communist invasion and 
also to preserve our future independence and freedom, 
we consider it most essential for Tibet to secure 
admission of her membership in the United Nations 
General Assembly.104 
The Foreign Office, however, refused to consider this.  It 
recognized that the proposal would face a veto from Russia 
and China.105  More critically, Britain’s “interest in Tibet in 
the past had been the result of the need to secure its 
position in India.  Now that strategic considerations had 
devolved to the GOI [Government of India], there were 
relatively few British economic interests in the country.”106  
Britain therefore referred Tibet’s solicitation to K.P.S.  
Menon, India’s Foreign Secretary.  Menon, in turn, took to 
heart the advice of Sardar Pannikar, India’s Ambassador to 
China, who had remarked that India should “wash her 
 
 103 GYATSO, supra note 92, at 60.  Avedon notes that, following the Thirteenth 
Dalai Lama’s death, the Tibetan government virtually ignored the army and, at the 
time of China’s invasion, Tibet’s formal military forces amounted to “little more than 
a glorified border patrol . . . .”  AVEDON, supra note 90, at 27. 
 104 Telegram from the Kashag to the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, 
Dec. 3, 1949, reprinted in SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 18. 
 105 Bevin’s telegram in reply noted in part that “the Kashag [should realize] that 
admission to the UNO [United Nations Organization] is subject to the approval not 
merely of the UNO Assembly but also of the Security Council where the veto is 
operative, and for obvious reasons it would be quite unrealistic in present 
circumstances to hope to secure Tibet’s admission . . . .”  See id. 
 106 Id. at 19. 
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hands completely of Tibet.”107  Menon feared that any action 
on Tibet’s behalf would appear to confirm China’s 
allegations of an Anglo-Indian conspiracy in Tibet.  At a 
minimum, such action threatened to exacerbate Sino-Indian 
relations at a time when India could not afford this risk.108  
India’s apprehensions increased when the Chinese 
government warned India that “receiving ‘an illegal 
[Tibetan] delegation’ would be considered ‘entertaining 
hostile intentions against the Chinese People’s Republic.’”109  
(It is no coincidence that today the Chinese government 
employs virtually identical threats and language to 
dissuade nations from receiving governmental delegations 
from the Republic of China (Taiwan) or from receiving the 
Dalai Lama “officially.”)110 
Similar requests communicated directly by the Kashag to 
India, Nepal, and the United States generated virtually 
identical “polite but negative” replies.111  All three 
governments agreed that supporting Tibet’s bid would 
“provoke” China; that “it was politically and logistically 
impossible”; and—in retrospect, naïvely—that “if unpro-
voked, [China] might be content to maintain Tibet’s 
traditional autonomy.”112  The United States, the nation in 
which the Kashag placed its greatest hope after Britain’s 
lasseiz-faire attitude became clear, therefore refused to take 
the lead in supporting Tibet’s plea to the United Nations.  
United States Ambassador Lloyd Henderson informed the 
Tibetan government’s representative in New Delhi that 
Tibet’s request for admission to the United Nations would 
certainly be vetoed by China and Russia.  And it might 
 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. 
 109 AVEDON, supra note 90, at 27. 
 110 The Chinese government therefore viewed President Bush’s formal meeting 
with the Dalai Lama in May 2001 as a hostile act.  E.g., Feng Qihua, Dalai’s U.S. 
Tour Strains Ties, CHINA DAILY, May 25, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7482427.  Had 
it not been for China’s anxiety about U.S. support for Beijing’s 2008 Olympics bid, 
this may well have provoked a more serious response from the Chinese government. 
 111 See AVEDON, supra note 90, at 27. 
 112 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 44. 
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“‘serve to precipitate Chinese Communist action to gain 
control [of] Tibet.’”113  India, finally, not only refused to 
champion Tibet’s cause at the United Nations, but also 
made clear that, should China carry out its threatened 
invasion, the Tibetan government should expect no military 
assistance.114 
India’s position, above all, proved dispositive of Tibet’s 
early efforts to secure political recognition.  Both the United 
States and Britain remained sympathetic to Tibet.  After 
China did invade, each expressed willingness to support 
Tibet’s appeal to the General Assembly.  But both nations 
continued to feel obliged to defer to India, which they 
viewed as the nation with the most at stake in any 
resolution of Tibet’s legal status.  And India suffered from 
the naïve belief that “support for China over other issues,” 
coupled with refusal to formally recognize Tibet, would 
“prevent[] China from directly antagonising India by 
invading Tibet.”115  The Korean War exacerbated this 
pattern, and it continued after China invaded Tibet in 1950.  
In effect, these events precluded any meaningful discourse 
on Tibet’s legal status at the United Nations. 
2. Appeal to the United Nations 
The victory of Mao Zedong’s PLA over the KMT initiated 
a resurgence of Chinese nationalism, manifest in a fervor to 
“liberate” China from “foreign elements” by annexing the 
diverse territories and peoples that had, to varying degrees, 
been loosely incorporated into some ancient “Chinese”116 
empires (most recently, that of the Manchu Dynasty).  
China scholar John King Fairbank notes that, ironically, 
“the [communist] revolution, which brought a sort of self-
 
 113 IX FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE FAR EAST; CHINA 1096. 
 114 See GYATSO, supra note 92, at 61. 
 115 SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 26. 
 116 It is worth noting that these empires—the Mongol and Manchu dynasties—
were not, in fact, Chinese at all. 
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determination to the Chinese people, kept them in a 
colonialist-imperialist posture toward the adjoining peoples 
of Tibet, Sinkiang [East Turkestan], and Mongolia.”117  On 
October 25, 1950, China announced its intention to 
“liberate” Tibet from “imperialist oppression.”118 Twelve 
days later, the Tibetan government cabled its final appeal 
as a sovereign state to the United Nations: 
The attention of the world is riveted on Korea, where 
aggression is being resisted by an international force.  
Similar happenings in remote Tibet are passing 
without notice. . . .  We can assure you, Mr.  Secretary-
General, that Tibet will not go down without a fight, 
though there is little hope that a nation dedicated to 
peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men 
trained to war, but we understand that the United 
Nations has decided to stop aggression whenever it 
takes place.  The armed invasion of Tibet for the 
incorporation of Tibet in Communist China through 
sheer physical force is a clear case of aggression. . . .  
The problem is simple.  The Chinese claim Tibet as a 
part of China.  Tibetans feel that racially, culturally, 
and geographically they are far apart from the 
Chinese.  If the Chinese find the reactions of the 
Tibetans to their unnatural claim not acceptable, there 
are other civilized methods by which they could 
ascertain the views of the people of Tibet; or, should 
the issue be surely juridical, they are open to seek 
redress in an international court of law. . . .119 
 
 117 JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION 1800-1985, at 10 
(1986). 
 118 AVEDON, supra note 90, at 32 (quoting Radio Peking, Oct. 25, 1950).  In 
response to India’s protestation, China maintained that “‘the problem of Tibet is 
entirely the domestic problem of China.  No foreign interference will be tolerated.’”  
Id. 
 119 Cablegram from the Kashag and the National Assembly of Tibet to the United 
Nations, Nov. 11, 1950, U.N. Doc. A/1549 (1950), reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, 
supra note 85, at 334. 
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The Kashag’s cable attempted to impress upon the United 
Nations three critical points.  First, by linking Tibet’s 
circumstances to those in Korea, the Tibetan government 
sought to indicate that Tibet, like Korea, constituted an 
independent state threatened by foreign invasion.120  
Second, by emphasizing the racial, cultural, and geographic 
differences between the Chinese and Tibetan peoples—and 
by recounting a series of historical divides between China 
and Tibet (omitted from the excerpt above)—the Kashag 
invoked the “self-determination of peoples,” a diplomatic 
legacy of former President Wilson,121 which would 
subsequently be codified122 and applied to virtually every 
colony except Tibet.  Third, the Tibetan government 
appealed to the newly established provision barring the 
threat or use of force in international relations.  The 
Kashag’s cable thus represents one of the first attempts to 
invoke the principle of non-aggression codified in article 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter.123  The latter two principles now 
constitute axioms of international law, even if neither 
receives consistent respect in practice.  But in 1950, at the 
outset of the Cold War, political expediency carried far 
greater force than either principle.  Tibet’s appeal was 
promptly tabled. 
Above all, Tibet faced problems generated by its 
isolationist history: Few government officials knew of 
Tibet’s existence, let alone its legal status.124  In fact, officials 
at the U.N. Secretariat thought the Kashag’s appeal came 
from a non-governmental organization.  Absent 
 
 120 See SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 52. 
 121 E.g., Speech of Woodrow Wilson, (Feb. 11, 1918), in 1 WOODROW WILSON, 
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, & PUBLIC PAPERS, 1917-1924, at 117 (R.S. 
Baker & W.E. Dodd eds., 1927); Michla Pmerance, The United States and Self-
Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 2 (1976); 
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27 (1990). 
 122 ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 1. 
 123 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state . . . .”). 
 124 SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 53. 
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intervention by the British delegate, who explained Tibet’s 
circumstances in general terms, the Secretariat would have 
recorded the appeal “on the routine list of communications 
from non-governmental organisations” and dismissed it.125  
But Britain thereafter refused to seize the initiative.  It 
chose to continue its post-colonial policy of deference to 
India on all matters concerning Tibet.126  And the U.S. State 
Department followed suit.  Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
informed Indian Prime Minister Nehru that the United 
States would support India’s position on Tibet, and he 
instructed the U.S. delegation not to raise the “Tibet issue” 
on its own initiative.127  India then fell back upon its 
customary position.  Its U.N. delegate explained that 
[i]n the latest note received by his Government, the 
Peking Government had declared that it had not 
abandoned its intention to settle those difficulties [i.e., 
China’s occupation of Tibet] by peaceful means. . . .  
[S]uch a settlement could safeguard the autonomy 
which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while 
maintaining its historical association with China.128 
But by this time, the Indian delegate’s implication that 
“Tibet and China were willing to settle the dispute 
peacefully” was simply false.  The Indian delegate knew full 
well that the Kashag had not decided to negotiate with 
China.129  India’s motivation, as before, was to avoid 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 See id. at 54.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the British Delegation wrote candidly, 
“What we want to do is to create a situation which does not oblige us in practice to 
do anything about the Communist invasion of Tibet.”  Id. at 55. 
 127 Id. 
 128 U.N. GAOR General Committee, 5th Sess., 73d mtg., (1950) (statement of the 
delegate of India), reprinted in INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 46 
(quoting U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 812th mtg, U.N. Doc. A/PV.812, para. 124) (1959). 
 129 SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 58. 
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antagonizing China.  Any action it took on Tibet could 
jeopardize its role in mediating the Korean conflict.130 
El Salvador ultimately proved the unlikely but sole 
proponent of Tibet’s appeal.  Hecto David Castro, the 
Salvadoran delegate, noted that Tibet had enjoyed genuine 
independence since at least 1912.  China’s actions therefore 
constituted unprovoked aggression against a sovereign 
state in violation of the U.N. Charter.  Castro submitted a 
resolution to this effect for immediate action.131  But several 
factors prevented its consideration.  First, the Korean War 
dominated the General Assembly’s agenda.132  Second, 
Russian delegate K.J. Malik urged adjournment of the 
debate because in his view Tibet remained exclusively 
within China’s “domestic jurisdiction.” Third, and again 
dispositively, the governments of Britain and the United 
States deferred to the Indian delegate’s (false) 
representation that peaceful settlement negotiations were 
in progress, which might obviate the need to consider the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict.  The “General Committee [therefore] 
unanimously decided to postpone sine die consideration of 
[Castro’s] draft resolution to the General Assembly.”133 
After learning this, the disheartened Tibetan government 
immediately transmitted a second cable to the Secretary 
General inviting the United Nations to send a fact-finding 
mission to Tibet to investigate for itself, but to no avail.134  
 
 130 See id. at 60 (quoting a communication from the Government of India [GOI] 
stating that “if GOI should press the Tibetan case just now in the U.N., Communist 
China would be alienated to such an extent [that] GOI would lose all ameliorating 
influence on Peiping [Beijing] re: Korea and related problems”). 
 131 See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 145; see also SHAKYA, supra note 
88, at 56. 
 132 The General Assembly had recently “confirmed that Chinese forces had 
intervened in Korea,” and on the day Tibet’s appeal arrived, General MacArthur 
launched a massive offensive in Korea.  VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 145.  
See also SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 56. 
 133 SHAKYA, supra note 91, at 57. 
 134 See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 146 (citing Note by Secretary 
General Communicating Text of Cablegram, dated Dec. 8, 1950, from the Tibetan 
Delegation, G.A. Doc. A/1658 (1950)). 
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The United States, whose interest in Tibet at that time 
remained largely a product of its then-prevailing national 
neurosis about the spread of communism, later struggled to 
find a way to raise the issue.  But it continued to decline to 
seize the initiative itself.  And before it could mobilize 
alternative support for Tibet, a delegation that the Dalai 
Lama had reluctantly sent to Beijing to negotiate with 
China signed the so-called 17-Point Agreement, which 
purported to “reunite” Tibet with the Chinese 
“Motherland.”135 
B. Tibet’s Status: An Analysis of Tibet’s Right to Legal 
Recognition 
“On the basis of the 17-Point Agreement,”136 Avedon 
wrote, “Tibet lost its identity as a nation-state.”137  
Undoubtedly, Tibet did lose its de facto independence after 
the invasion.  Under international law, however, neither 
China’s military conquest nor the 17-Point Agreement could 
deprive Tibet of de jure statehood.  The legal criteria 
reviewed in Part I support the inference that Tibet was—
and remains—independent.  If the series of events by which 
Tibet allegedly lost its independence occurred today, we 
would be hard pressed to distinguish them from Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait or Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor.  
While military action against China on this basis would 
clearly be destructive, neither is it constructive to continue 
to indulge the fiction that Tibet’s post-War history renders 
 
 135 See Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government 
of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951, P.R.C.-
Tibet, para. 1 [hereinafter 17-Point Agreement], reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, 
supra note 85, at 337. 
 136 The 17-Point Agreement purports to leave Tibet’s existing political system 
intact and to preserve the “established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai 
Lama.”  See id. para. 4.  But paragraph 14 surrenders foreign affairs control to 
China; and, in practice, internal affairs, as the Dalai Lama recalled shortly after 
arriving in exile, remained, at best, under the Tibetan government’s nominal 
authority.  See GYATSO, supra note 92, at 95-96. 
 137 AVEDON, supra note 90, at 36. 
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it a “part of” China.  Indeed, in Tibet’s case, among others, 
such an ongoing act of formal recognition enables a 
“violation[] of international law . . . to create rights in 
international law.”138 
1.  Tibet’s Status at the Time of the China’s Invasion 
The precise nature of Tibet’s historical relationship with 
China remains contentious and complicated.139  But all 
politically independent analysts agree that from 1913 to 
1950 Tibet enjoyed de facto independence and statehood.140  
The International Commission of Jurists carried out 
extensive investigations of Tibet’s legal status and human 
rights conditions in 1959, 1960, and 1997.  It concluded that 
before the invasion “Tibet had achieved de facto 
independence and all of the requirements of de jure 
independence except formal international recognition.”141  
Tsering Shakya notes that on “the eve of the Chinese 
invasion in October 1950, the Tibetan Government 
exercised internal and external freedom, which clearly 
demonstrated the country’s independence.”142  Michael C. 
van Walt van Praag, whose 1987 study provides an 
exhaustive, hermetic analysis of Tibet’s international legal 
status, concludes that the existence of the Tibetan State 
was “largely uninterrupted” throughout history and 
indisputably established between 1911 and October 1950.143  
Historian Melvyn C. Goldstein, criticized in some circles as 
too sympathetic to China’s occupation of Tibet, nonetheless 
affirms, after noting the odd structure of the traditional 
 
 138 ROTH, supra note 16, at 125. 
 139 For a comprehensive historical treatment of Tibet’s political and legal status, 
see sources cited infra note 143. 
 140 See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 140 (“Few scholars seriously 
challenge the notion that Tibet possessed actual independence at least between 1911 
and 1950.”) (emphasis added). 
 141 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 43. 
 142 SHAKYA, supra note 91, at xxiv. 
 143 VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 141. 
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Tibetan government, that “[t]his, however, does not imply 
that the central government [i.e., the Dalai Lama, the 
Kashag, and the National Assembly] did not exercise 
authority over the entire country; it did.”144 
Without unnecessarily reiterating the analyses of these 
and other scholars, it is worth noting that their 
observations find support in the traditional legal principles 
for determining the existence of statehood enunciated above 
in Part I: 
Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of 
statehood as generally accepted under international 
law.  In 1950 there was a people and a territory, and a 
government which functioned in that territory, 
conducting its own domestic affairs free from any 
outside authority.  From 1913-1950 foreign relations of 
Tibet were conducted exclusively by the Government of 
Tibet and countries with whom Tibet had foreign 
relations are shown by official documents to have 
treated Tibet in practice as an independent state.145 
The sole factor evincing statehood that Tibet lacked during 
this period was “formal international recognition,”146 
 
 144 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 85, at 6.  See also LEE FEIGON, DEMISTIFYING TIBET 
(1998); WARREN SMITH, TIBETAN NATION (1996); CONFERENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAWYERS ON ISSUES RELATING TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE FOR 
TIBET, TIBET: THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993); Dawa Norbu, 
Selfdetermination in the Post-Soviet Era: A Case Study of Tibet, 34 J. INT’L L. STUD. 
237 (1997) (all reaching the same general conclusion—that Tibet constituted an 
independent state at a minimum from 1913 to 1950).  But see INFORMATION OFFICE 
OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, TIBET—ITS 
OWNERSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION (Sept. 1992), available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/6.html (explaining China’s official 
position, which, to my knowledge, no independent historical or legal scholar shares). 
 145 LEGAL INQUIRY COMMITTEE ON TIBET, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF 
JURISTS, TIBET & THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 5-6 (1960).  It is also worth 
noting that Tibet possessed a unique legal system, independent from that of China.  
See REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF 
BUDDHIST TIBET (1999). 
 146 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 43. 
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meaning political recognition.  As an initial matter, recall 
that the declaratory model of statehood does not recognize 
this as a relevant factor at all; and under the constitutivist 
model, political recognition, while crucial, remains a highly 
ambiguous criterion. 
Even under the constituvist model, however, the State of 
Tibet probably received enough political recognition to 
satisfy this criterion.  Despite the paucity of formal acts of 
recognition it received, Tibet had the capacity to, and did, 
enter into foreign relations with other states, as evinced by 
treaties that it concluded with them.147  And despite 
reluctance to raise the Tibet issue publicly at the General 
Assembly, both Great Britain and the United States 
 
 147 E.g., Convention Between Great Britain, China, and Tibet, arts. 1-2, July 3, 
1914, arts. 1-2, reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at App. 19 (Simla 
Convention) (recognizing that Tibet remains under the “suzerainty” of China in 
Tibet, but affirming that it shall “remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at 
Lhasa” and that “[t]he Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a 
Chinese province”); Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between the Government of 
Mongolia and Tibet, Dec. 29, 1912, Mong.-Tibet, arts. 1-3, reprinted in VAN WALT 
VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at App. 17 (1987) (mutually recognizing each other’s 
formal independence and resolving to cooperate in matter of defense and the 
preservation of the Buddhist faith); Convention Between Great Britain and Thibet, 
Sept. 7, 1904, Gr. Brit.-Tibet, reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 
App. 10 (1987) (resolving trade disputes between Great Britain and Tibet, albeit in a 
characteristically colonial “treaty”); Treaty Between Nepal and Tibet, Mar. 1856, 
Nepal-Tibet, reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at App. 5 (1987); 
Peace Treaty Between Ladakh and Tibet at Tingmosgang (1684).  Most troubling for 
China’s claim that Tibet always has been a part of China is the Sino-Tibetan treaty 
of 821/823 A.D., which states that:  
Both Tibet and China shall keep the country and frontiers of which they are 
now in possession.  The whole region to the east of that being the country of 
Great Tibet, from either side of that frontier there shall be no warfare, no 
hostile invasions, and no seizure of territory . . . . And in order that this 
agreement establishing a great era when Tibetans shall be happy in Tibet 
and Chinese shall be happy in China shall never be changed, the Three 
Jewels, the body of saints, the sun and moon, planets and starts have been 
invoked as witnesses . . . . 
Sino-Tibetan Treaty, 821/823 A.D., China-Tibet, reprinted in VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, 
supra note 85, at App. 2 (1987) (emphasis added).  Ironically, a pillar memorializing 
the Sino-Tibetan treaty and containing this precise inscription remains standing in 
the Barkhor Square in central Lhasa, Tibet’s capital.  The foregoing treaties are also 
available at http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/index/treaties. 
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privately affirmed Tibet’s statehood.  A 1950 
communication from the British Foreign Office, deliberately 
kept confidential at the time, concluded that “since Tibet 
has from 1913 not only enjoyed full control over her 
internal affairs but also has maintained direct relations on 
her own account with other States, she must be regarded as 
a State to which Article 35(2) of the U.N. Charter 
applies . . . .”148  The U.S. State Department, in a similar 
confidential communication to Britain, wrote: 
The United States, which was one of the early 
supporters of the principle of self-determination of 
peoples, believes that the Tibetan people has the same 
inherent right as any other to have the determining 
voice in its political destiny . . . .  [S]hould 
developments warrant, consideration could be given to 
recognition of Tibet as an independent State.149 
In fact, while U.S. Ambassador Lloyd W. Henderson 
complied with the official American policy of deference to 
India, he asked then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, “Is it 
logical for [the] U.N. which gave Indonesia which was 
under Dutch sovereignty, [a] hearing to ignore Tibet?”150 
Finally, Tibet’s lack of significant political recognition 
prior to 1950 is not a function of any inherent deficiency as 
a nation-state.  Rather, it resulted from the misguided 
isolationist policies pursued by the Tibetan government 
during the pre-War era.  For this reason, most states never 
had occasion to consider Tibet’s status.  It is therefore 
neither conclusive nor even particularly informative to note 
that few declared formal views on the matter.  If they had 
 
 148 British Foreign Office, 371-84454 (1950), reprinted in SHAKYA, supra note 91, 
at 54. 
 149 Aide-Memoire from the U.S. Department of State to the British Embassy (Dec. 
30, 1950), reprinted in 6 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 613 (1950). 
 150 Letter from Lloyd W. Henderson, U.S. Ambassador to the Secretary of State 
(Dec. 30, 1950), reprinted in 6 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 612 
(1950). 
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had occasion to consider Tibet’s status, it would have been 
apparent that Tibet—one of the few Asian nations never to 
be colonized by a European imperial power151—maintained 
as much, if not more, of a legitimate claim to statehood than 
those territories that, in the post-War era of decolonization, 
began to receive formal recognition as states.  Given the 
critical role of state practice on the international law of 
recognition vis-à-vis former colonies and non-self-governing 
territories, it bears emphasizing that few, if any, states 
maintained, at that time, that putative states—for example, 
the Belgian Congo, the Dutch East Indies, or the colonies of 
French equatorial-Africa—did not merit statehood because 
they lacked statehood or formal recognition in the past.  
Indeed, whereas many states born in the post-War era 
share little more than a common history of colonial 
exploitation, Tibet’s national polis shares religious, 
linguistic, racial, cultural, historical, and political bonds 
dating back millennia, the very factors traditionally 
constitutive of a “people”152 with a distinct national 
identity.153 Ironically, at the very time in history when 
 
 151 Great Britain enjoyed considerable trading privileges in Tibet during the turn 
of the century, but it never colonized Tibet, as it did neighboring India, nor did it 
purport to supplant Tibet’s government. 
 152 In 1990, the United Nations Economic and Social Cooperation Organization 
(UNESCO) defined a “people” in terms of the following “objective” factors: 
1.  (a) a common historical tradition; (b) racial or ethnic identity; (c) cultural 
homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological affinity; (f) territorial 
connection; (g) a common economic life.  2.  The group must be of a certain number 
which need not be large (e.g., the people of micro states), but which must be more 
than a mere association of individuals within a state . . . . 4.  The group must have 
institutions or other means of expressing its common characteristics and will for 
identity.” 
International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Rights of Peoples, 
UNESCO, Paris, SHS. 89/ CONF. 602/7 (1990).  The Tibetan people satisfy each of 
these criteria.  Norbu, supra note 85, at 254-63. 
 153 The salience of these factors is apparent to Tibetans.  Tsering Shakya, in the 
introduction to the autobiography of former Tibetan political prisoner Palden 
Gyatso, captures this point well: 
Academics and lawyers can produce persuasive arguments to demonstrate 
that Tibet was always independent or that it was always a part of China, 
but for people like Palden and for hundreds of ordinary Tibetans, the finer 
points of international diplomacy and the canons of international law have 
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Europe began to promote decolonization and extend the 
right to self-determination to formerly subjugated peoples, 
these same states declined to consider the appeal of an 
extant state being colonized. 
2. The Effect of China’s Military Occupation of Tibet 
A state established under international law continues to 
exist “unless and until the source or validity of [its] 
government has indisputably been transferred . . . to the 
government of another State.”154  Before the mid-nineteenth 
century, military conquest remained a valid method of 
acquiring territory and transferring its sovereignty to the 
conquering government.155  But the propriety of this method 
has now been decisively repudiated.156  Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter establishes that member states shall “refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state.”157  On October 24, 1970, the 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 2625, which 
proclaims that “[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from 
the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.”158  In 
his most recent treatise, Brownlie states without 
qualification that “illegal occupation cannot of itself 
 
never been particularly relevant.  Palden is convinced of Tibet’s 
separateness and independence because that is his common experience.  
The two countries are separated by tradition, culture, language and history.  
For him, that is a fact as clear as the difference between milk and water. 
Tsering Shakya, Preface to PALDEN GYATSO, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A TIBETAN 
MONK (1997); see also SMITH, supra note 85, at 360-61 (noting that “Tibet was 
unique among the frontier territories the CCP attempted to integrate into the 
Chinese state . . . Tibetans were united by a cultural and religious identity and a 
primarily latent but autochthonous nationalist consciousness”). 
 154 BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 177. 
 155 See id. at 178. 
 156 See generally KORMAN, supra note 69, at 218-34. 
 157 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
 158 G.A. Res. (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 
(1970). 
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terminate statehood.”159  Finally, even assuming that 
military conquest remains, under exigent circumstances, a 
legitimate means of acquiring sovereignty over a formerly 
independent state, China itself does not acknowledge the 
validity of this method; nor does it invoke this theory in 
support of its “ownership” of Tibet.160  If Tibet lost its right 
to recognition as a state in 1950, it was thus not because of 
the Chinese invasion.  The other possibility is the 17-Point 
Agreement. 
3. The Status of the 17-Point Agreement Under International 
Law 
After its failure to secure consideration by the United 
Nations and under growing military pressure, the Tibetan 
government sent delegates to Beijing to negotiate.  The 
delegates repudiated then Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s 
initial proposal because it described Tibet as an integral 
part of China.  But under duress that included threats of 
“both personal violence and large-scale military retaliation 
against Tibet,”161 the twenty-three delegates, acting without 
the authority or approval of the Tibetan government, signed 
the 17-Point Agreement.  This treaty purported to “reunite” 
Tibet with the Chinese “Motherland.”  To date, China “does 
not itself recognize conquest, annexation, or prescription as 
modes of valid territorial acquisition and, furthermore, . . . 
has never claimed to have acquired title to Tibet through 
any of these modes.”162  But in view of Tibet’s statehood in 
1950, neither could China have acquired sovereignty by 
 
 159 BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 78.  For this same reason, “[i]t is not correct to 
describe governments-in-exile as states without people or territory when the 
displacement is caused by a belligerent occupation.”  Id. at 78 n.56. 
 160 See VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 188 (noting that the Chinese 
government has never claimed title to Tibet in virtue of its military occupation but 
has instead advanced as justification its “prior possession of a legal title,” based on a 
highly questionable history of Sino-Tibetan political relations). 
 161 AVEDON, supra note 90, at 35. 
 162 VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 188. 
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means of the 17-Point Agreement.  A review of the 
customary international law of treaties belies this 
contention. 
As a preliminary matter, it is revealing to note that China 
felt the need to enter into a treaty—a state-to-state 
“contract”—with an entity that it claims was never an 
independent state with the capacity to contract.  In any 
event the 17-Point Agreement does not represent a valid 
transfer of Tibet’s sovereignty to China.  The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that 
expressions of state consent “procured by the coercion of its 
representative through acts or threats directed against 
him” or “by the threat or use of force” shall be void and 
“without any legal effect.”163  The Convention was not in 
force when the Chinese government coerced the Tibetan 
delegates in Beijing to sign the 17-Point Agreement.  But 
its terms represent a codification of the customary 
international law of treaties.164  The threats directed against 
Tibet’s delegates to compel them to sign the 17-Point 
Agreement therefore render it void and without legal effect.  
The Tibetan government arguably acceded to the treaty by 
subsequently abiding by its terms.  But van Walt van Praag 
clarifies that: 
the state of coercion by which the treaty was imposed 
continued [until the Dalai Lama’s exile in 1959]. . . .  
[T]he Dalai Lama and his government were at no time 
in a position to freely express their acceptance or 
rejection of the terms of the 17-Point Agreement.165 
 
 163 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 51-52, 
reprinted at 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 164 See id. at preamble (observing that “principles of free consent and of good 
faith . . . are universally recognized,” and describing the Vienna Convention as a 
“codification . . . of the law of treaties”). 
 165 VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 165. 
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Furthermore, de facto enforcement of a treaty does not 
validate its de jure illegality.166  Moreover, during the Dalai 
Lama’s flight into exile in March 1959, while still in 
Tibetan territory, he formally repudiated the 17-Point 
Agreement.167 
Absent a specific provision relating to withdrawal, 
international law does not generally permit unilateral 
denunciation to nullify treaty obligations.168  But the 
Tibetan government’s repudiation proves justified here 
because of breach.169  By 1959, China had abrogated the 17-
Point Agreement by, inter alia, undermining the integrity of 
the local government, restricting religious freedom, altering 
the status and powers of the Dalai Lama, and, most 
egregiously, bombarding Lhasa and massacring the Tibetan 
people on March 10, 1959.  In view of these violations, “the 
Government of Tibet was entitled to repudiate the 
agreement as it did in 1959.”170  The 17-Point Agreement of 
1951 was therefore “null and void ab initio, leaving the 
legal independence of Tibet intact at the time of its 
conclusion”171 and abrogated by China, precluding its 
present invocation to establish Chinese sovereignty over 
Tibet. 
In sum, neither Tibet’s military conquest by China nor 
the 17-Point Agreement altered Tibet’s legal status as of 
1950.  Tibet remains, according to the international legal 
criteria for recognition, a nation-state under illegal foreign 
occupation.  And “Tibetans are a ‘people under alien 
 
 166 See FAIRBORZ NOZARI, UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (1971). 
 167 TENZIN GYATSO, FREEDOM IN EXILE 141 (1990). 
 168 See BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 621. 
 169 See id. at 622 (observing that “material breach by one party entitles the other 
party or parties to a treaty to invoke the breach as the ground of termination or 
suspension”).  See also Vienna Convention, art. 60(1), supra note 162, reprinted at 8 
I.L.M. 679 (1969) (“A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties 
entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or 
suspending its operation in whole or in part.”). 
 170 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 21. 
 171 VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 165. 
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subjugation,’ entitled under international law to the right of 
self-determination, by which they freely determine their 
political status.”172 
C. The Force of Popular Moral Opinion: Manifestations of Civil 
Recognition 
One commentator has noted that “[o]nce history’s stage 
was peopled with kings and princes.  Now it seems that 
almost anyone with letterhead stationary and a tax 
identification number can crowd on as well.”173  Civil 
recognition practices embrace a vast array of international 
actors.  These include nongovernmental organizations, 
scholars, popular media, and individually elected 
government officials whose actions and views, though not 
binding state practice, still serve as a powerful mouthpiece 
for their constituency’s popular moral opinion.  The 
dramatic increase in these practices invites inquiry into 
what influence, if any, they can or should exert on the 
evolution of international norms of recognition in the 
modern world order.   
Non-sovereign actors, particularly nongovernmental and 
transnational institutions, can help to resolve difficulties 
that states alone possess neither the resources nor the 
political will to tackle.174  But hortatory proclamations, 
academic writing, and advisory roles in international 
institutions do not effect direct changes in international 
law.  On the whole, these actors can effect change only by 
influencing governments.175  Even transnational bodies, 
which often prove more efficacious because they enjoy a 
foundation in treaty law and influential relations with their 
 
 172 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 21. 
 173 Paul Lewis, Not Just Governments Make War or Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 
1998, at B9. 
 174 See id. (noting the success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 
initiated by Nobel Peace Prize-winner Jodi Williams). 
 175 See id. (quoting Owen Harris). 
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constituent sovereigns, can only enact change to the extent 
that the states that comprise them genuinely pursue the 
policies they promote or—in rare cases—prescribe. 
But precisely because their influence on states has 
increased in the post-War era, civil recognition practices 
merit appraisal in the context of the complex and 
multifaceted nature of the modern international law of 
recognition. Today, “[m]ultilateral organizations, 
transgovermental channels between agencies charged with 
similar tasks, contacts with state-owned enterprises or 
trade bodies, and various sorts of informal envoys all 
provide alternatives to diplomatic missions, as do the 
services of third parties.”176  Tibet provides insight into the 
growing influence of civil recognition.  For many reasons—
some admirable, some superficial—scholars, transnational 
institutions, NGOs, popular media, and individually elected 
governmental representatives have been attracted to the 
“Tibet issue” in recent years; and their influence has not 
been negligible. 
1. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
In 1987 and 1989, the Chinese military brutally 
suppressed a series of peaceful pro-independence 
demonstrations in Lhasa.177  Shortly thereafter, the NGO 
community of Tibet Support Groups (TSGs) proliferated 
rapidly.  In May 2000, more than 300 delegates from fifty-
two countries worldwide established the International Tibet 
Support Network (ITSN).  ITSN comprises more than “100 
organizational members from all Asia, Europe, the 
Americas and Africa.”178  Some of its members support full 
 
 176 Peterson, supra note 53, at 48. 
 177 For an account of these events and their aftermath, see generally TIBET 
INFORMATION NETWORK & LAW ASIA ASSOCIATION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 
DEFYING THE DRAGON: CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIBET (1991). 
 178 International Tibet Support Network, About ITSN, at 
http://www.tibet.org/itsn/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2002). 
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independence for Tibet; others focus specifically on human 
rights, environmental exploitation, education, healthcare, 
or other humanitarian concerns.  To be sure, the TSG 
community does not speak with one voice.179  But they share 
a common conviction: China’s occupation of Tibet fails to 
respect the Tibetan people’s right to self-determination and 
causes severe human rights and environmental abuses, as 
well as social, economic, and cultural decay.180  For this 
reason, many TSGs increasingly express a growing 
consensus that unless and until China permits the Tibetan 
people to exercise their right to self-determination, the 
negative consequences of its occupation of Tibet will 
continue.181 
NGOs not specifically devoted to Tibet also do not speak 
univocally.  The Unrepresented Nations and People’s 
Organization (UNPO), not surprisingly, shares the TSG 
view that Tibet is a state under colonial occupation by 
China.182  Human Rights Watch, by contrast, refuses—as a 
matter of its corporate mandate and concerns about its 
institutional integrity—to take any stand on the issue of 
 
 179 For example, compare the position of Students for a Free Tibet, which tends to 
take a more hard-line, pro-independence stance, with that of the International 
Campaign for Tibet, which tends to focus on initiating negotiations between Beijing 
and the Tibetan government-in-exile to promote some kind of “genuine autonomy” 
arrangement for Tibet.  See Students for a Free Tibet, Why Tibet?, at 
http://www.tibet.org/sft/tibet.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2002); International Campaign 
for Tibet, About ICT: Mission, at http://www.savetibet.org/About/AboutList.cfm?c=2 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2002). 
 180 E.g., INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that economic 
issues, assaults on Tibetan culture, human rights abuses, and political difficulties all 
“flow from the denial of the Tibetan people’s most fundamental right—to exercise 
self-determination”). 
 181 E.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF LAWYERS FOR TIBET, A GENERATION IN 
PERIL: THE LIVES OF TIBETAN CHILDREN UNDER CHINESE RULE 111 (2001) 
(concluding that violations of Tibetan children’s rights in the areas of political rights, 
education, healthcare, and nutrition, while amenable to improvement by specific 
recommendations, are “unlikely to cease until the Chinese government returns 
responsibility for the welfare of Tibetan children to their parents—and to a 
government based upon an act of self-determination by the Tibetan people”). 
 182 See UNREPRESENTED NATIONS & PEOPLE’S ORGANIZATION: YEARBOOK 1997, 
“CHINA’S TIBET”: THE WORLD’S LARGEST REMAINING COLONY 40-48 (1997). 
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Tibet’s status or the legitimacy of its government-in-exile:183  
This is a “political” issue, not a “human rights” issue.  
Amnesty International, similarly, avoids taking an express 
stance on this issue.  It, too, fears being perceived as, not an 
impartial human rights advocate, but an NGO with a 
“political persuasion.”184  The irony—indeed, hypocrisy—of 
this position is that self-determination is a human right.185  
Institutional reluctance to acknowledge this may be 
understandable, first, because the meaning of self-
determination remains highly contentious;186 and second, 
because the efficacy of NGOs—their ability to carry out 
their essential activities (monitoring and advocacy)—
depends to an appreciable degree on their international 
perception as apolitical.  But recognition that China 
continues to violate the Tibetan people’s human right to 
self-determination need not imply a particular stance on 
Tibet’s right to recognition as a state under international 
law.  It may counsel a more moderate position, such as 
encouraging China to permit the Tibetan people to 
participate in an internationally-supervised referendum on 
their political status, as the International Commission of 
Jurists in fact recommended.187  Indeed, at the recent U.N. 
World Conference Against Racism, the first U.N. conference 
at which Tibetan NGOs and government-in-exile 
representatives succeeded—over China’s vehement 
objection—in obtaining accreditation, the NGO forum 
denounced the “colonial occupation of Tibet” and called for 
an internationally monitored referendum in Tibet.188 
 
 183 See, e.g., Mickey Spiegel, China and Tibet: Profiles of Tibetan Exiles, 11 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2 n.1 (1999); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA & TIBET 
INFORMATION NETWORK, supra note 2, at 1 n.1. 
 184 See Amnesty International, About Amnesty, at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ 
web/aboutai.nsf (last visited Jan. 24, 2002); Statute of Amnesty International (as 
amended, 23d Int’l Council Meeting, Cape Town, South Africa, Dec. 19, 1997), 
available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/aboutai.nsf/. 
 185 ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 1. 
 186 See generally Fox, supra note 3. 
 187 See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, at 24. 
 188 See NGO Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference Against 
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2. Legal and Historical Scholarship 
Politically independent legal and historical scholars agree 
at a minimum that Tibet indisputably established its 
statehood between 1913 and 1950; and that events after 
this period did not alter this status validly.  But scholars 
have not called on governments to extend Tibet the formal 
recognition that their writings suggest it merits; indeed, 
one commentator specifically disavowed this position.189  
The historian Lee Feigon writes only that understanding 
Tibet’s status may serve to “demolish myths not only about 
Tibet but also about China, especially the notion that China 
has always been the zhongguo or “Central Kingdom” to the 
various cultures and peoples in the region,” particularly 
“[b]efore the emergence of the modern nation states . . . .”190  
Like NGOs outside the TSG community, the failure of legal 
and historical scholars to take an explicit stance on Tibet’s 
 
Racism, ¶¶ 101-03 & 65-66, Sept. 2, 2001. 
 189 See W. Gary Vause, Tibet to Tienamen: Chinese Human Rights and the United 
States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1575, 1611-12 (1989) (describing 
congressional activity indicating support for Tibet’s formal recognition as an 
“attempted usurpation of presidential powers” that “directly contravened all other 
congressional and executive acts in the continuous pattern of recognition of China 
for more than a decade.”).  Vause argues that “[i]nvolvement in the separatist 
movement . . . and the political programs advocated by the Dalai Lama, are not 
legitimate roles for Congress.”  Id. at 1613.  Characterizing Tibet’s independence 
movement as “separatist,” as does China, reflects an odd position in view of the 
uniform view of scholars that Tibet remains an independent state under illegal 
foreign occupation. 
 190 LEE FEIGON, Foreword, DEMISTYIFYING TIBET, at x-xi (1996).  The roots of this 
misconception date to the early twentieth century, when Sun Yat-Sen elaborated the 
Min Ts’u doctrine (“doctrine of the national group”).  E.g., Sun Yat-Sen, Lecture 
(Jan. 27, 1924), in SUN YAT-SEN: HIS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEALS 163 (Leonard 
Shihlien Hsü trans. & ed. 1933).  Chiang Kai-Shek, Sun’s sucessor, perpetuated and 
expanded this doctrine in China’s Destiny, in which he argued that Tibetans, 
Mongols, Manchus, and other “national minorities” constituted racial “stocks” within 
the Chinese national group.  See CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHINA’S DESTINY 10-14 (1947).  
Mao, in turn, co-opted  this stance within his communist vision of a unified 
proletariat; he conceived of “minority” nationalism as yet another manifestation of 
Marxist “false consciousness.”  E.g., Mao Tse-Tung, The Relationship Between the 
Han Nationality and the Minority Nationality, in V SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG 38-40 (Pergamon Press trans. & ed. 1977); see generally SMITH, supra note 85, 
at 332-39 (discussing the genesis of Mao’s conception of nationalism). 
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right to recognition as a state reflects awareness of their 
institutional role and perhaps also concern about its 
integrity: Scholarship, generally speaking, should avoid 
polemics.  Despite this reluctance, insofar as scholarship 
reflects civil recognition, its implications for Tibet’s right to 
recognition are largely uniform.  Like NGOs, the academic 
community agrees, at a minimum, that Tibetans are a 
“people” and that China has failed to extend them the right 
to self-determination. 
3. Civil Society 
Expressions of civil society’s popular sentiments take 
diverse forms: demonstrations, films, fiction, and editorials, 
to name a few of the most visible.  For Tibet, these forms of 
popular support have proved one of the most remarkable, 
unique, and efficacious factors that animate calls for the 
Tibetan people’s right to self-determination.  Annual 
“Tibetan Freedom Concerts,” featuring popular musicians 
such as Pearl Jam, the Beastie Boys, and David Bowie, 
enjoy huge audiences in Washington, D.C., and major 
European capitals; novelists select Tibet as a setting for 
fictional narratives in order to call attention to its plight;191 
Hollywood produces films, such as Kundun and Seven Years 
in Tibet, which, while superficially apolitical, often provoke 
serious and hostile responses from Beijing.192  Indeed, a 
growing number of actors, most prominently, Richard Gere, 
Harrison Ford, Steven Siegel and Pierce Brosnan, have 
become powerful advocates of Tibetan independence and 
human rights.  In August 2001, in fact, Richard Gere 
 
 191 E.g., JAMYANG NORBU, THE MANDALA OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (2000); HERGE, 
TINTIN IN TIBET (1998). 
 192 See, e.g., Xinhua Eng. Newsletter, Article Blasts U.S. Backing Dalai’s 
Separatist Activities, May 25, 2001 (summarizing Xinhua News Agency, China’s 
Official Press) (“The anti-China forces with the American film industry have played 
up the so-called Tibetan issues in recent years by producing such films as ‘Kundun’ 
and ‘Seven Years in Tibet,’ which distort facts and confuse right and wrong, the 
article says.”), available at 2001 WL 21401458. 
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agreed to appear in the popular cartoon series The 
Simpsons on condition that the “episode include a scene 
calling for the freedom of Tibet.”193 
The plethora of “Tibet chic” that pervades Western society 
recently led journalist and China scholar Orville Schell, Jr.  
to describe a “virtual Tibet,” as manifest in popular media, 
and as distinct from the “real” Tibet.194  Popular support for 
the Tibetan people frequently takes the form of express civil 
advocacy for Tibetan independence, a phenomenon that 
Schell views as remarkable.  He notes that “Free Tibet” 
bumper stickers, for example, are ubiquitous, whereas 
“Free Kosovo” stickers (prior to the U.N. transitional 
administration that assumed power after the 1999 NATO 
campaign) remained rare.195  China perceives a genuine 
threat in these manifestations of civil recognition.  After the 
release of Kundun, for example, the government sponsored 
its own counter-Kundun to describe the “real history of the 
Dalai and the Panchen Lama and Tibet.”196  Popular support 
for Tibet emboldens calls for its recognition and helps to 
ensure that the world does not neglect the isolated 
“Shangri-la” that U.N. officials once mistook for a non-
governmental organization. 
4. Support From Individual Elected Representatives 
In a democratic society, civil recognition manifests itself 
not only in popular media but also through individual 
expressions of support from elected representatives.  These 
officials do not, of course, dictate state practice 
 
 193 Richard Gere to Appear in the Simpsons, ANANOVA (Aug. 11, 2001), available 
at http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/2001/8/14_4.html. 
 194 See ORVILLE SCHELL, VIRTUAL TIBET: SEARCHING FOR SHANGRI-LA FROM THE 
HIMALAYAS TO HOLLYWOOD 11 (2000). 
 195 See id. 
 196 Interview with Chime Tsomo, former Tibetan tour-guide and U.S. asylee who 
witnessed the film’s production and suffered persecution for refusing to translate 
information about this film to a group of Western tourists, New York, NY (Mar. 12, 
2001) (on file with author). 
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independently.  But their advocacy and interests often 
prove to be powerful forces of civil recognition that can, over 
time, influence state practice.  In August 1997, for example, 
Congressman Frank Wolf visited Tibet covertly to see for 
himself its human rights and environmental conditions.197  
Wolf is now one of more than one-hundred House 
cosponsors of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2001, which, inter 
alia, “reaffirms that Tibet, including those Tibetan areas 
incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, 
Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai, is an occupied country under 
the established principles of international law.”198  In July 
1999, Bob Brown, an Australian Senator from Tasmania, 
undertook a similar covert fact-finding trip to Tibet.199  He 
has become one of the foremost proponents of Tibetan 
independence.200 Here again, China perceives a serious 
threat in these expressions of support for Tibet from 
individually elected representatives, who, after all, do not 
dictate state practice. 201  Free from the executive branch’s 
 
 197 Representative Wolf’s trip report is available on line at 
http://www.house.gov/wolf/199789Tibet.htm. 
 198 Tibetan Policy Act of 2001 (TPA), § 4(1), H.R. Bill No. 1779, 107th Cong., May 
9, 2001; S. Bill No. 852, § 4(1), 107th Cong., 1st Sess., May 9, 2001. 
 199 See Australian Politician Sneaks Into Tibet, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE., July 
29, 1999.  Shortly after Senator Brown’s covert visit, another Australian politician, 
Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives Garry Nehl, visited Tibet but this 
time under the aegis of the Chinese authorities.  Not surprisingly, he concluded that 
Brown had been mistaken.  “There were absolutely no signs of Tibet being a police 
state nor of the people being oppressed.”  Brendan Nicholson, Tibet Better Off Under 
China: MP, THE AGE , Sept.  21, 1999, at 10 (quoting Representative Nehl).  These 
conflicting reports caused considerable controversy.  See Michael Zekulich, MP’s 
Tibet Comments ‘Outrageous’, WEST AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 21, 1999. 
 200 E.g., Senator Bob Brown, The Shame of Tibet Will Not Go Away, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 12, 1999. 
 201 For China’s reaction to Congressman Wolf’s visit, see, for example, Joe 
McDonald, China Angry Over U.S. Lawmaker’s Criticism of Tibet, AP, Aug. 24, 
1997; Beijing Blasts U.S.  Congressman’s Tibet Remarks as ‘Wanton Slander’, 
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 25, 1997.  Shortly after Wolf’s clandestine visit, 
Xinhua issued an English newswire “refuting” Wolf’s claims based on the claims of 
alleged “Tibetologists.”  Overseas Tibetologists Refute Wolf’s Remarks, XINHUA ENG. 
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 2, 1997.  For China’s reaction to Senator Brown’s visit, see, for 
example, Chinese Anger Over Brown’s Visit to Tibet, AUSTR. BROADCAST NEWS, July 
29, 1999 (quoting Chinese Ambassador to Australia Zhang’s hostile response in the 
aftermath of Brown’s visit); China to ‘Check’ How Australian Politician Got Into 
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need to preserve the delicate state of diplomatic relations 
with China, however, these representatives often find 
themselves in a position to express more candidly their 
views on Tibet’s right to recognition. 
The Conference of World Parliamentarians, convened at 
New Delhi on March 20, 1994, issued a statement asserting 
that “[t]he Chinese invasion . . .reduced Tibet, in effect, to 
the status of a Chinese colony and an occupied country.”202  
The U.S. Congress has passed numerous resolutions 
validating Tibet’s claim to statehood and declaring it an 
independent state under illegal foreign occupation.203  And 
recently, the Polish assembly, the Sejm, issued a 
declaration regarding “Solidarity of the Sejm of the 
Republic of Poland with the Tibetan Nation,” which refers 
repeatedly to Tibet as a “nation” and a “country” oppressed 
by China.204 
 
Tibet, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, July 30, 1999. 
 202 World Parliamentarians Convention on Tibet, New Delhi Statement on 
Tibetan Freedom, ¶ 2, New Delhi, Mar. 20, 1994. 
 203 See, for example, S. Res.169, Sep. 8, 1995; see also Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title 
V, § 536, 108 Stat. 481 (1994)(“Reporting Requirements on Occupied Tibet”) 
(“Congress has determined that Tibet is an occupied sovereign country under 
international law.”); Pub. L. 102-138, Title III, § 355, 108 Stat. 481 (“China’s Illegal 
Control of Tibet”), Oct. 28, 1991 (expressing the sense of Congress that “Tibet, 
including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, 
Gansu and Qinghai, is an occupied country under the established principles of 
international law”). 
 204 Declaration of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland regarding Solidarity of the 
Sejm of the Republic of Poland with the Tibetan Nation, Aug. 24, 2001, at 
http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/Tybet/declarationfin.html (last visited May 1, 2002); see 
also Canada Tibet Comm., World Tibet Network News: German Parliament Adopts 
Tibet Resolution (Apr. 20, 2002), at http://www.tibet.ca/english/index.html (citing 
Declaration of the Bundestag of Germany regarding Human Rights and 
Development in Tibet, Apr. 19, 2002); Canada Tibet Comm., World Tibet Network 
News: Italian Parliamentary Group for Tibet Established (May 9, 2002), at 
http://www.tibet.ca/english/index.html (legislative group for Tibet charged with 
preparing and submitting a draft resolution calling for “[r]ecognition of the Tibetan 
Government in Exile as the real representative of the Tibetan people by 
governments in the European Union, if Beijing does not grant full autonomy for 
Tibet within three years”).   
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5. Transnational Institutions 
Transnational institutions and organizations, such as 
those of the United Nations, the Organization of American 
States, and the European Union, also at times reflect 
popular moral sentiment.  Their capacity to do this varies 
depending on how much independence they enjoy from 
constituent states.  U.N. bodies have therefore, with one 
exception, been unwilling to consider Tibet since 1965, 
when the General Assembly last issued a resolution on 
Tibet.205 Member states remain largely beholden to China’s 
economic and political influence.  By contrast, the European 
Parliament, the sole directly elected representative body in 
the European Union framework, consistently passes 
resolutions condemning China’s occupation and human 
rights violations in Tibet.  Recently, these culminated in an 
extraordinary resolution in which the Parliament, recalling 
Tibet’s illegal invasion by China, proclaimed that if, within 
three years, China continues to refuse to negotiate a 
genuine autonomous status for Tibet with the Tibetan 
government-in-exile, the constituent states of the European 
Union should extend formal recognition to the Tibetan 
government-in-exile.206  On the date of the China-European 
Union Summit in Brussels, Per Gahrton, Chairman of the 
European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the 
People’s Republic of China, issued a statement to the 
Council of Europe and the European Commission, urging 
these institutions to communicate to China that “if no 
solution to the Tibet issue has been implemented by June 
 
 205 G.A. Res. 2079, GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14 at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2079 
(1965).  See U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/37 (1992); G.A. 
Res. 1353, GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 61, U.N. Doc. A/Res/1353 (1959); G.A. 
Res. 1723, GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/Res/1723 (1961). 
 206 European Parliament Resolution on the Western China Poverty Reduction and 
the Future of Tibet, ¶ 2, Tibet B5-0608, 0610, 0617, 0621 and 0641/2000, available at 
http://www.tibet.ca/english/index.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). 
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2004 at the latest, the EU countries will consider 
recognizing the Tibetan government in exile.”207 
6. Conclusion:  The Impact of Civil Recognition 
It would be easy to dismiss these manifestations of civil 
recognition as merely hortatory or quixotic—to note that, in 
the context of international relations, they remain largely 
ineffectual.  But this understates their growing impact on 
state practice.  Absent civil recognition, for example, it is 
unlikely that President Bush would have been inclined to 
receive the Dalai Lama formally, a movement that 
generated serious friction with China’s political elite 
precisely because it implied his recognition as a head of 
state.  In May 2001, the House of Representatives and the 
Senate concurrently introduced the Tibetan Policy Act of 
2001 (TPA).  This legislation, inter alia, (1) declares Tibet 
an “occupied country under the established principles of 
international law”; (2) institutionalizes within the State 
Department the position of Special Coordinator for Tibet; 
(3) mandates a reporting requirement on Tibet “whenever a 
report is transmitted to the Congress on a country-by-
country basis”; and (4) instructs the executive branch to 
oppose all efforts to block discussion of Tibet’s status at the 
United Nations and to support the appointment of a special 
rapporteur on Tibet.208 
Responses to the July 6 resolution of the European 
Parliament remain to be seen.  It is unlikely that most 
national governments will abide by its suggestion in the 
near future.  On the other hand, civil recognition, even if 
 
 207 Letter from Per Gahrton, Chairman, European Parliament Delegation for 
Relations with the People’s Republic of China, to the Council of Europe and the 
European Commission, Sept. 7, 2001. 
 208 TPA, S.852.IS, 107th Cong. § 4(1), 7, 6, 16 (2001).  China’s response was 
immediate and predictable.  Its state press described the TPA as “another U.S. 
maneuver to poke its nose into China’s internal affairs.”  Xin Zhiming, Ignorant or 
Just Arrogant, CHINA DAILY, May 14, 2001. 
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incapable of producing immediate changes in state practice, 
ensures that China’s continuing occupation of Tibet does 
not become obscured by the passage of time.  It keeps the 
issue alive, such that, should internal political dynamics 
within China change in the future, which is not unlikely,209 
the factual predicate for recognizing Tibet’s statehood and 
right to self-determination does not disappear behind a veil 
of government rhetoric.  The Chinese government is not 
unaware of this danger.  It responded vehemently to the 
European Parliament’s Resolution, which according to its 
state press, “deliberately called the Chinese territory [of] 
Tibet a ‘country,’ slandering that China ‘occupied’ Tibet.”210 
Civil recognition practices not only manifest popular 
moral sentiment; they also animate over time real actions 
that influence states to change their recognition practices, 
or at least, to render them somewhat more ambiguous than 
they might otherwise become.  It remains unlikely in the 
near future that any state will formally recognize Tibet.  
But civil recognition practices ensure that China’s 
insistence that Tibet is part of China does not obscure 
Tibet’s true legal status and its people’s right to self-
determination.  Without it, China’s ongoing struggle to 
convince the world that Tibet has always been a part of 
China would be far easier.  Ensuring that Tibet remains, in 
the perception of civil society, a state under illegal 
occupation, not an “internal affair” of China, is an essential 
predicate to vindicating Tibet’s claim to statehood in the 
future. 
III. THE TIBETAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE: 
RECOGNITION AND CIVIL LEGITIMACY 
Distinguishing recognition of governments from that of 
states proves difficult because, to reiterate, “the existence of 
 
 209 See GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001). 
 210 PRC Opposes European Parliament’s Resolution on Tibet, XINHUA, July 14, 
2000, available at 2000 WL 24051363. 
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an effective and independent government is the essence of 
statehood, and, significantly, recognition of states may take 
the form of recognition of a government.”211  But states 
without recognized governments exist (e.g., Somalia and 
Burma), and similarly, governments without recognized 
corresponding states—i.e., governments-in-exile—emerge 
under some circumstances. Broadly speaking, governments-
in-exile are “opposition groups that struggle from outside 
their territory to overthrow and replace the regime in their 
independent, occupied, or claimed home country.”212  Their 
formal legal status is often easy to state: none.  But their 
resilience as international actors invites inquiry into 
whether it is useful to distinguish, as for putative states, 
between the multifaceted political, legal, and civil 
recognition practices of governments toward governments-
in-exile—for such entities, if and when they displace the 
regime in the territories to which they aspire, may receive 
political recognition.  One question then becomes what 
influence their legal and civil recognition in the preceding 
period should exert on political recognition at that time. 
The Tibetan government-in-exile, which has now existed 
for more than forty years, offers unique insight into this 
question.  Although it still lacks political recognition, it 
remains perhaps the most resilient and effective 
government-in-exile in history.  It also enjoys a strong claim 
to legitimacy based on contemporary international norms.  
To appraise its status fully, it is instructive to distinguish 
again between the political, legal, and civil dimensions of 
recognition practices.  Because much of this discussion 
would overlap with the preceding analysis of Tibet’s 
statehood, however, I will not reiterate the above 
observations insofar as they speak as much to the status of 
Tibet’s government as they do to its statehood. 
 
 211 BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 91.  See also MENON, supra note 15, at 36, 106; 
PETERSON, supra note 12, at 2. 
 212 Yossi Shain, Introduction, Governments-in-Exile and the Age of Democratic 
Transitions, in GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE, supra note 43, at 2. 
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A. Political Recognition: Governing a Constituency Without a 
State 
Despite the European Parliament’s efforts, the Tibetan 
government-in-exile’s formal recognition remains, to date, 
non-existent.  No government in the world recognizes the 
Tibetan government-in-exile as a government.  But this 
observation does not end the analysis.  Political recognition 
practices toward the Dalai Lama’s putative government are 
more complex.  Many states that lack the political will 
formally to recognize the Tibetan government nonetheless 
extend to it humanitarian aid to assist its “nationals” and 
engage its political elite in diplomatic dialogue.  The United 
States, for example, provides more than $100,000 annually 
to assist the government-in-exile to process and care for its 
growing constituency (i.e., newly arrived Tibetan refugees) 
and more than $2 million in development aid to Tibetans 
still residing within Chinese-occupied Tibet.213  And its chief 
executive not infrequently meets with the Tibetan 
government-in-exile’s head of state, the Fourteenth Dalai 
Lama.  States remain sensitive to offending China, but 
many receive the Dalai Lama in a manner that implies this 
political status.  For this reason, President Bush’s official 
audience with the Dalai Lama in May 2001 provoked a 
more hostile response from China’s elite than former 
President Clinton’s “drop by” meeting with him. 
In terms of a constituency, more than 100,000 stateless 
Tibetans, forced from their nation by persecution or born 
and raised in Tibetan communities in India and Nepal, 
view the Tibetan government-in-exile as their legitimate 
political representative.  Many Tibetans who remain in 
Chinese-occupied Tibet also view the Dalai Lama’s 
government, rather than the Chinese elite installed by 
Beijing to govern the TAR, as their genuine political 
 
 213 Interview with Julia Taft, former Assistant Secretary of State for Population, 
Migration, and Refugees, and Special Coordinator for Tibet during the Clinton 
Administration, Washington, D.C., (Apr. 17, 2001) (on file with author). 
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representative.  Finally, it is worth noting that the efforts of 
the United States and Western Europe to convince China to 
enter into negotiations with the Tibetan government-in-
exile imply, as they do for Taiwan, “state-to-state” relations 
inconsistent with a complete absence of political 
recognition. 
Beyond this, little can be said.  Despite these acts, no 
government recognizes the Tibetan government-in-exile 
formally at present.  But to appraise state practice in this 
regard, it is critical to recognize that the incidents of 
governmental recognition, such as those noted above, and 
not only the formal positions of states expressed in 
diplomatic exchanges, have implications for political 
recognition practices toward governments-in-exile. 
B. Legal Recognition of Governments-in-Exile: Precedents and 
Evolving Norms 
Objective criteria to assess the Tibetan government-in-
exile’s right to legal recognition do not exist in international 
law.  International law generally acknowledges that 
“[r]ecognition [of governments], as a public act of state, is an 
optional and political act and there is no legal duty in this 
regard.”214  Traditionally, states remain free to recognize or 
decline to recognize putative governments to further their 
diplomatic objectives and ideologies.215  But today, this may 
not be strictly accurate.  The United Nations and its 
derivative framework have established precedents for so-
called “regimes of non-recognition”:216 At times, the U.N. 
 
 214 BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 90.  See also HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 400 (1966). 
 215 Shain, supra note 45, at  219. 
 216 See, e.g., Thomas D. Grant, East Timor, the U.N. System, and Enforcing Non-
Recognition in International Law, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 273, 280-96 (2000) 
(reviewing “regimes of non-recognition” arguably established by the United Nations 
in the post-War era); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ 16, 58 (June 21) (holding that U.N member states 
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Security Council instructs states to refuse recognition to 
governments that purport to exercise control over certain 
territory in what the international community deems an 
illegitimate fashion.  Prominent examples include South 
Africa’s occupation of Namibia after the United Nations 
withdrew its mandate, the State Law and Order Council’s 
regime in Burma (Myanmar), and the Taliban’s government 
in Afghanistan.  Despite the effective control exercised by 
these regimes, contemporary norms of human rights and 
democracy have led the international community to refuse 
them recognition. 
Second, even prior to the establishment of the United 
Nations, governments-in-exile did, under certain exigent 
circumstances, enjoy legal status despite their inability to 
exercise effective control over their territory or 
constituency: 
Between the 1920s and the 1940s recognized 
governments-in-exile were for the most part 
governments deposed by a native or foreign regime.  
They were recognized as the legal and de jure 
sovereign power of their country, and were treated ‘as 
if they were still ruling the state even though their 
government had lost effective control.’217 
During World War II, the Allies extended this precedent.  
Deposed regimes of Nazi-occupied Europe retained de jure 
recognition that entitled their political leaders to diplomatic 
immunity and other rights.  Under the Maritime Courts Act 
of 1941, for example, the Allied governments-in-exile 
enjoyed jurisdiction over their nationals residing in foreign 
states.  This meant, inter alia, that they could maintain 
 
must “recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia” and refrain 
from acts or dealings with the South African government respecting or implying 
recognition of the government’s authority in this territory); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 202(2) (1987). 
 217 Shain, supra note 45, at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted ). 
SLOANE.DOC 2/9/2005  2:00 PM 
2002] A CASE STUDY OF TIBET 171 
 
armies, control assets situated outside their occupied 
territory, and try their own nationals for specified 
offenses.218  At the same time, “[t]he Allied powers, using 
the legal democratic principle to justify their recognition of 
the deposed governments, were hesitant to grant similar 
recognition to Charles de Gaulle’s Free French which had 
no legal status prior to its creation.”219 
Governments-in-exile during World War II thus 
established two crucial legal precedents: First, the Allies’ 
treatment of deposed European governments as de jure 
sovereigns emphasized the emerging criteria of liberal 
democratic legitimacy and a movement away from strict 
reliance on the Tinoco “effective control” criterion.  Second, 
given sufficient recognition and the existence of a host 
state, the deposed European governments-in-exile, though 
unable to secure control of their territory, showed that 
governments without corresponding states can still perform 
some of the characteristic functions of a sovereign. 
Based on historical precedents, Yossi Shain therefore 
notes that governments-in-exile historically have fallen into 
three principal categories:220 (1) lawfully elected, traditional 
or authentic exiles, who do not challenge the existence of a 
given state but claim title as its genuine representative 
(e.g., the deposed Spanish Republican government, which 
existed from the outset of the Spanish Civil War in the 
1930s until the first democratic elections in Spain in 1977); 
(2) governments aspiring to statehood, characteristic of the 
era of decolonization (e.g., the self-proclaimed Sahawari 
Arab Democratic Republic, formed to challenge the 
annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco); and (3) deposed 
regimes struggling to regain power lost to a foreign invader 
 
 218 Shain, supra note 43, at 224; see, e.g., Neth. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 
405 (2d Cir. 1953) (giving effect to legislation and regulations of the Netherlands 
government-in-exile passed during World War II); but see Nat’l Coalition Gov’t of 
Union of Burma v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 219 Shain, supra note 43, at 225. 
 220 Id. at 2-5 
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(e.g., the London-based governments-in-exile of 
Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Yugoslavia, and Belgium, which subsisted during 
World War II).  These categories are dynamic, and the 
status of governments-in-exile may vary over time.  The 
Tibetan government-in-exile, for example, should be 
categorized simultaneously under both (1) and (3).  In 
theory, classification does not render a putative government 
more or less legitimate; in practice, however, the “support of 
[government-in-exiles’] alleged constituencies may be the 
most critical factor in determining validity of their claim 
and the attitude of foreign patrons toward their 
struggles.”221 
Accordingly, the Tibetan government-in-exile cannot be 
established as legally legitimate (or illegitimate); 
unequivocal international legal criteria capable of 
bestowing these labels simply do not exist at present.  From 
the perspective of Tinoco, China’s puppet government in the 
TAR is the legitimate government of Tibet.222  From the 
perspective of the Tobar approach, by contrast, the Dalai 
Lama’s government remains the legitimate political 
representative of Tibet.223  While the Tibetan government-
in-exile therefore continues—largely because of China’s 
geopolitical and economic influence and permanent seat on 
the U.N. Security Council—to suffer from a lack of political 
recognition, it enjoys, as measured by emerging criteria, a 
strong claim to legal recognition. 
 
 221 Id. at 5. 
 222 For a description of the TAR’s de jure and de facto governmental power 
structure, see INT’L CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET & THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW GROUP, THE MYTH OF TIBETAN AUTONOMY (1994). 
 223 VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 184.  For more recent evidence of 
continuing support within Tibet for the Dalai Lama and his government, see TIBET 
INFO. NETWORK & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, CUTTING OFF THE SERPENT’S HEAD 
(1996). 
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C. Civil Recognition: The Self-Determination of Peoples and 
Putative Governments 
Contemporary trends in international law also animate 
civil recognition practices toward the Tibetan government-
in-exile.  Recently, there has been what some scholars call a 
“paradigm shift in the legal norms that govern regime 
legitimation.”224  Increasingly, the recognition of 
governments-in-exile has been based on criteria connected 
to popular sovereignty.  This is true most often of putative 
regimes that represent a “dispossessed government trying 
to prolong a de jure international status” in the face of 
foreign military occupation or a coup rather than—as most 
post-War governments-in-exile had been—“aspiring exiled 
contenders seeking to transform their self-proclaimed de 
jure status into de facto control of a given target 
territory.”225  The post-War establishment of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
the subsequent proliferation of treaties constitutive of the 
contemporary international human rights regime226 
contributed to entrenching the “self-determination of 
peoples”227 as a paramount principle of governmental 
legitimacy.  In theory, the United Nations therefore now 
serves as the “custodian of collective legitimacy . . . .”228 
In practice, however, most post-War governments-in-exile 
have been, by contrast to the exile governments of World 
War II, self-proclaimed liberation movements,229 “whose 
 
 224 Edward Collins, Jr. & Timothy M. Cole, Regime Legitimation in Instances of 
Coup-Caused Governments-in-Exile: The Cases of Presidents Makarios and Aristide, 
5 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 199, 199 (1996); see also W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and 
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990). 
 225 Shain, supra note 43. 
 226 See id. (noting that in the post-war period, “individuals, not only governments, 
[became] legal entities in the eyes of international law”.). 
 227 U.N. CHARTER, art. 55. 
 228 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the 
United Nations, 20 INT’L ORG. 367, 367-68 (Summer 1966); see generally DUGARD, 
supra note 7. 
 229 See Shain, supra note 45, at 227. 
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existence is by nature tenuous.”230  The United Nations and 
its constituent states, too, continue to employ recognition of 
governments as a political tool, often unrelated to the “self-
determination of peoples” criterion.  To take one (apropos) 
example, 
despite the fact that the U.N. Charter prohibits the 
acquisition of territory and the annexation of people by 
means of force, a majority of governments has avoided 
challenging the annexation of Tibet by China, and has 
denied recognition to the Dalai Lama’s government-in-
exile, even though it has enjoyed the overwhelming 
support of the Tibetans in the diaspora and under 
Chinese occupation.  At the same time, Pol Pot’s 
criminal DK exiled government has been granted 
recognition as the authentic representative of the 
people of Cambodia, on whom it has been perpetrating 
genocide.231 
But the principles (or lack thereof) that govern political 
recognition of governments-in-exile should be distinguished 
from those that confer civil legitimacy.232  With respect to 
the latter, for instance, Reisman argues that, while not yet 
instantiated, “aspirational norms provide a positive 
environment for appraising domestic contexts with 
international criteria and for legitimizing the use of the 
technique of governments-in-exile.”233  Indeed, the Second 
Circuit recently confirmed this trend toward distinguishing 
political recognition from tacit declarations of legitimacy.  
In National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 
the court wrote: “[A]s this century draws to a close, the 
practice of extending formal recognition to new 
governments has altered: The United States Department of 
State has sometimes refrained from announcing recognition 
 
 230 Id. at 21. 
 231 Id. at 234. 
 232 See id. at 235. 
 233 Reisman, supra note 55, at 242. 
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of a new government because grants of recognition have 
been misinterpreted as pronouncements of approval [i.e., 
legitimacy].”234 
The Tibetan government-in-exile continues to suffer from 
a lack of political recognition, but to the extent that we 
appraise civil recognition criteria, it retains a strong claim 
to legitimacy.  Shain notes that “[w]hether governments-in-
exile are fictional entities or serious contenders is a 
function of their ability to obtain the loyalty of their states’ 
constituencies . . . and to mobilize foreign support for their 
goal . . . diplomatic recognition is only one among many 
factors, neither sufficient nor necessary . . . .”235  Based on 
Word War II and post-War precedents, the additional 
factors to be considered in the modern world order arguably 
include a government-in-exile’s (1) continuity with a prior 
existing regime, which retains a legitimate claim to 
authority over the territory and people it aspires to govern; 
(2) resilience, a putative government’s ability to project, 
under the auspices of a host state, an enduring 
international profile to challenge the legitimacy of the 
ruling regime; (3) efficacy, the ability of a putative 
government to exercise some traditional functions of 
sovereignty and to provide aid and assistance to its 
constituency in exile; and (4) popular support, the degree of 
civil support enjoyed by a putative government from both 
its exile and aspirational constituency. 
 
 234 Nat’l Petrochem. Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 
1988) (citing 77 STATE DEP’T BULL. 462-63 (Oct. 10, 1977)); see also Sean D. Murphy 
& Mary Beth West, The Impact of U.S. Litigation on Non-Recognition of Foreign 
Governments, 26 STAN. J. INT’L L. 435, 436 (1990) (noting that in the twentieth 
century recognition began to signify “not merely realistic appraisal of a new entity’s 
status but approval of the entity itself,” and consequently, “the United States [has 
become] unwilling to ‘recognize’ governments that, although admittedly in control of 
their states, [are] essentially anti-democratic”); see also Murphy & West, supra at 
436 n.103 (1990) (citing 1969 statements by the Senate and the executive branch 
indicating that recognition and the exchange of diplomatic representatives does not 
imply U.S. approval of the “form, ideology, or policy” of the recognized government). 
 235 Shain, supra note 45, at 232. 
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Measured by these criteria, the Tibetan government-in-
exile maintains a high degree of civil recognition: The Dalai 
Lama’s putative government is not a “self-proclaimed 
liberation movement.”  To the contrary, it remains the 
direct successor of the government forced into exile by 
China’s military invasion in 1949.  Its subsequent adoption 
of a constitution that provides for free and fair elections 
bolsters its legitimacy under contemporary norms of 
democracy.  In July 2001, in fact, more than 100,000 
Tibetans living in exile went to the polls to elect their first 
Prime Minister, Samdong Rinpoche. 
The Tibetan government-in-exile has also proved 
remarkably resilient.  Ever since the Dalai Lama’s 
entourage arrived in exile in March 1959, India has 
provided the government-in-exile with an amiable host 
state.  India maintains historical, religious, and cultural 
affinities with Tibet; and large sectors of its population 
revere the personage of the Dalai Lama.  Consequently, 
then Prime Minister Nehru officially welcomed the Dalai 
Lama when he arrived in India,236 and the State of India 
has since provided his exile government with a de facto 
territory, employment, and humanitarian aid.237  The 
Tibetan government-in-exile’s enduring presence as a 
quasi-state actor—enhanced in no small part by the Dalai 
Lama’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989—continues 
to challenge the Chinese government’s claim to “ownership” 
of Tibet.238 
The Tibetan government-in-exile has also been 
remarkably effective.  Operating outside its aspirational 
territory, it has nonetheless been able to cultivate Tibetan 
culture abroad, provide education for its growing 
constituency, preserve the Tibetan national identity, 
provide assistance to the continuing influx of refugees 
 
 236 See French, supra note 45, at 188, 190. 
 237 See id. at 192. 
 238 See INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, TIBET—ITS OWNERSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION (1992). 
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entering through Nepal and Bhutan,239 participate (through 
the auspices of sympathetic NGOs) in international and 
national conferences and human rights fora, mobilize its 
people in diaspora, and—despite its lack of formal 
recognition—enlist a remarkable degree of support from 
foreign nations.  French observes that 
the tremendous success of the Tibetan refugees and 
their government-in-exile in preserving their own 
identities and cultural heritage has stood as an 
example for refugee organizations throughout the 
world.  Thirty years after the diaspora, Tibetan 
refugees have provided for the material success of their 
refugee population, educated their children, 
reconstructed much of their culture, preserved their 
religion and its monastic class, and kept a high degree 
of international profile.240 
Finally, while a precise measure of the political support 
enjoyed by the Dalai Lama’s government within its 
aspirational territory (historical Tibet) is not possible to 
gauge, available evidence overwhelmingly suggests that 
Tibetans within China continue to regard the Dalai Lama 
and his government-in-exile as the legitimate authority in 
Tibet.241  According to credible reports, most ordinary 
Tibetans view Chinese government officials as foreign 
elements, wholly without popular support.242 
Each of these four criterion, then, supports the conclusion 
that the Tibetan government-in-exile, like the Tibetan 
state, retains a strong claim to legitimacy bolstered by civil 
 
 239 For a description of the Tibetan government-in-exile’s work establishing a 
Tibetan community in exile in Nepal, see generally ANN ARMBRECHT FORBES, 
SETTLEMENTS OF HOPE: AN ACCOUNT OF TIBETAN REFUGEES IN NEPAL (1989). 
 240 French, supra note 45, at 200. 
 241 E.g., VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 85, at 185. 
 242 E.g., UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS, TIBET 
SUPPORT GROUP NEDERLAND, & INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, supra note 
88, at 74-75. 
SLOANE.DOC 2/9/2005  2:00 PM 
178 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 
 
recognition.  Again, these practices do not change the 
undeniable fact that China exercises effective control over 
Tibet or that every state in the world formally accepts Tibet 
as part of China.  But civil recognition practices do ensure 
that the international legitimacy that China seeks 
desperately remains beyond its political power to compel; 
and legitimacy is more crucial than may generally be 
recognized.  Without it, for example, China must spend 
millions of dollars annually to finance a large military and 
police force in Tibet; to encourage ethnic Chinese to resettle 
in Tibet in order to consolidate its base of political loyalty; 
to counter, thus far unsuccessfully, world opinion that 
remains highly critical of its human rights practices in 
Tibet; and above all, to govern effectively a foreign people, 
with a distinct language, set of values, cultural history, and 
loyalty—a people who for the most part decisively reject 
China’s authority in Tibet. 
That governments presently lack the political will to take 
more meaningful steps toward recognizing the state of Tibet 
and its putative government formally may reflect a 
misperception of the political consequences that would 
follow; and, more to the point, a failure to appreciate that, 
by neglecting to challenge China’s revisionist history and 
claim to sovereignty in Tibet, these states confer a venire of 
legitimacy on an ongoing violation of international law.  
The question therefore becomes whether civil and legal 
recognition, in the face of realpolitik, can help vindicate an 
unjustly denied right to political recognition over time.  To 
conclude, I focus on one prominent example in which it, at a 
minimum, contributed to this vindication: East Timor. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor.  Like Tibet, East 
Timor contains a wealth of natural resources and is 
geographically attached to its—now former—occupying 
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power.243  In the sixteenth century, Portugal colonized the 
island of Timor, and for more than two hundred years, it 
shared colonial control with Holland, which established 
authority over the surrounding region, the former Dutch 
East Indies.  In 1913, Holland and Portugal separated West 
and East Timor by treaty.244  Then, in 1949, at the outset of 
the decolonization era, Indonesia gained independence.  
West Timor chose to join the nascent state.  But East Timor 
remained under Portuguese control for the next twenty-five 
years, oppressed by the fascist regimes of Antonio de 
Oliveirea Salazar (1933-71) and Marcello Caetano (1971-
74).245  On April 25, 1974, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, 
leading a number of military officers, orchestrated the 
“Carnation Revolution,” overthrowing Caetano’s brutal 
regime.  The new Portuguese government, reacting to 
international pressure and military necessity, began to 
dismantle Portugal’s colonial empire. 
In August 1975, internal political fractions within East 
Timor’s newly established political parties culminated in a 
brief civil war.  Fretelin, the most pro-independence party 
quickly emerged victorious.246  From September to 
December 1975, Fretelin exercised effective control over 
East Timor because, during the civil war, the Portuguese 
interim-governor and his decolonization administration 
abdicated their responsibilities and fled.  Like Britain’s 
abdication of responsibility for Tibet after India gained its 
independence in 1949, Portugal’s lasseiz-faire approach left 
East Timor in legal limbo.  Portugal refused to recognize 
Fretelin’s declaration of independence on November 28, 
 
 243 See SONNY INBARAJ, EAST TIMOR: BLOOD AND TEARS IN ASEAN 21 (1995).  The 
Portuguese initially exploited East Timor for its sandalwood, a resource now largely 
depleted; later, East Timor became valued for its agricultural exports, including 
coffee, rubber, copra, and peanuts.  Additionally, “[t]here are extensive fish stocks 
and significant oil reserves along the southern coast and in the Timor Gap between 
East Timor and Australia.”  Id. 
 244 Id. at 20. 
 245 See id. 
 246 See id. at 29, 37. 
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1975, but it also declined to resume responsibility for East 
Timor’s decolonization.  The Democratic Republic of East 
Timor therefore remained suspended in political limbo, 
powerless to invoke either Portuguese assistance or the 
authority of the United Nations when, just two weeks later, 
Indonesia launched a blitzkrieg assault on Dili and annexed 
East Timor.247  As in Tibet, a guerilla war ensued.248  East 
Timorese resistance fighters sought to dispel the occupying 
foreign forces, which committed massive human rights 
abuses in an effort to consolidate their control.  By 1979, 
Indonesia’s brutal efforts to crush resistance in East Timor 
had displaced approximately 300,000 East Timorese—
nearly half the population—into “controlled hamlets,” 
where about 200,000 died of starvation and illness.249 
Here, however, the parallel to Tibet ends.  The United 
Nations rejected Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of 
East Timor, refused to recognize its authority, called upon 
Suharto’s government to withdraw its troops immediately, 
and affirmed the right of the East Timorese people freely to 
determine their political status.250  Security Council 
Resolution 384, issued on December 22, 1975, recognized 
“the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-
determination and independence” and called upon all states 
 
 247 Indonesia invaded East Timor the day after then President Gerald Ford and 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger completed a visit to Jakarta, and the United 
States apparently acquiesced, convinced by Indonesian President Suharto’s 
characterization of Fretelin as a communist party. 
 248 See id. at 46, 57-58.  For an account of Tibet’s guerilla resistance movement, 
which lasted from roughly 1959 to the early 1970s, supported for much of this time 
by the American CIA, see JOHN KENNETH KNAUS, ORPHANS OF THE COLD WAR: 
AMERICA AND THE TIBETAN STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL (1999). 
 249 See INBARAJ, supra note 241, at 68. 
 250 Two Security Council resolutions, eight General Assembly resolutions, and 
two Human Rights Commission resolutions were issued condemning Indonesia’s 
occupation of and human rights violations within East Timor.  See S.C. Res. 384 
(Dec. 22, 1975); S.C. Res. 389 (Apr. 22, 1976); G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX) (Dec. 12, 1975); 
G.A. Res. 31/53 (Dec. 1, 1976); G.A. Res. 32/34 (Nov. 28, 1977); G.A. Res. 33/39 (Dec. 
13, 1978); G.A. Res. 34/40 (Nov. 21, 1979); G.A. Res. 35/27 (Nov. 11, 1980); G.A. Res. 
36/50 (Nov. 24, 1981); G.A. Res. 37/30 (Nov. 23, 1982); H.R. Comm. Res. on the 
Situation in East Timor (Mar. 11, 1993); H.R. Comm. Res. 387 (Apr. 16, 1997). 
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“to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as 
the inalienable right of its people to self-determination in 
accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).”251  
Unlike Tibet, which every state acknowledges as part of 
China, only a handful of states—including, regrettably, the 
United States, which viewed Indonesia as an ally against 
communist expansion during the Cold War—recognized 
East Timor as a de facto part of Indonesia.252  Many, 
including China, expressly rejected Indonesia’s claim, 
declaring East Timor an independent state under illegal 
foreign occupation.253  In terms of political recognition, then, 
East Timor, unlike Tibet, never suffered international 
neglect at the level of state opinion—even though, like 
Tibet, most states treated East Timor in practice as part of 
Indonesia. 
But in terms of legal and civil recognition, East Timor 
never became part of Indonesia.  Unlike China, Indonesia, 
itself a former colony, could not claim that East Timor had 
“always” been part of its territory.  Nor could it invoke any 
treaty, like the 17-Point Agreement, that purported to 
“reunite” East Timor with Indonesia.  Its sole claim to 
sovereignty consisted in military annexation,254 which, as 
noted, no longer remains a valid means to acquire territory.  
Popular moral opinion, as well as legal and political 
recognition practices, rejected Indonesia’s annexation of 
East Timor.255 
 
 251 S.C. Res. 384 (Dec. 22, 1975). 
 252 The United States never formally recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty, but it 
treated Indonesia as its de facto government.  Significantly, in light of later 
developments, Australia was one of the only states to recognize the de jure 
incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia.  See Christine M. Chinkin, East Timor 
Moves to the World Court, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 206, 207 (1993) (quoting AUSTL. DEP’T 
OF FOREIGN AFF., ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 30 (1979)). 
 253 See Grant, supra note 7, at 299 n.96.  These included “Angola, Cape Verde, 
Guinea- Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Albania, Benin, Cambodia, 
the People’s Republic of China, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea (Conakry), North Korea, 
Laos, Vietnam, and Tanzania.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 254 See id. at 276 n.6. 
 255 See, e.g., Let East Timor Vote, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 15, 16; 
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These recognition practices—political, legal, and civil—
meant that the international community never accepted in 
theory, even though its actions tended to reflect in practice, 
Indonesia’s assertion of sovereignty over East Timor.  
Indeed, the complexity and tensions surrounding the 
modern concept of recognition emerged in the Case 
Concerning East Timor.  There, Portugal contended that 
international law—in particular, U.N. resolutions 
condemning Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor—obliged 
states not to recognize Indonesian sovereignty in East 
Timor.256  The majority held otherwise, concluding that 
these resolutions do not “impos[e] an obligation on States 
not to recognize any authority on the part of Indonesia over 
the Territory;” nor can it “be inferred from the sole fact that 
the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council refer to Portugal as the 
administering [p]ower of East Timor that they intended to 
establish an obligation on third States to treat exclusively 
with Portugal as regards the continental shelf of East 
Timor.”257 
The majority therefore held that it lacked jurisdiction, for 
any ruling on the merits would require adjudication of the 
rights and duties of Indonesia, a non-party over which the 
ICJ could not exercise compulsory jurisdiction.258  Judge 
Oda concurred on the grounds that the U.N. resolution did 
not provide Portugal with standing, even if it did establish 
a rule of nonrecognition toward Indonesia’s claim to 
sovereignty over East Timor, which, he noted, it had 
 
UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLE’S ORGANIZATION, THE QUESTION OF SELF-
DETERMINATION: THE CASES OF EAST TIMOR, TIBET AND WESTERN SAHARA (1996); 
East Timor Action Network, at http://www.etan.org/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2002). 
 256 East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).  For analysis, see 
generally Grant, supra note 7, at 300-10; Michael Shane French-Merrill, Note, The 
Role of the United Nations and Recognition in Sovereignty Determinations: How 
Australia Breached Its International Obligations in Ratifying the Timor Gap Treaty, 
8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285 (2000). 
 257 East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 103-04. 
 258 See id. at 105. 
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annexed by illegal force.259  Judges Weeraantry and 
Skubiszewski, by contrast, concluded that a law of non-
recognition derived from the prohibition on the acquisition 
of territory by force—established in the former’s view by 
U.N. resolutions concerning East Timor, and in the latter’s, 
by general principles of international law that operate erga 
omnes—precluded states from recognizing Indonesia’s 
sovereignty in East Timor.260 
The East Timor case did not, however, establish a 
mandatory rule of nonrecognition; if anything, its majority 
holding reaffirmed the discretionary nature of recognition 
in the absence of an express rule of law to the contrary 
prescribed by the Security Council (such as Resolution 662 
promulgated in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait).  But 
at the same time, it indicates the increasing complexity of 
recognition practices and law in situations where there has 
been a clear violation of the right to self-determination—for 
the court, despite its jurisdictional holding, reaffirmed this 
right in the penultimate paragraph of its judgment.261 
In 1999, Indonesian citizens forced the resignation of 
President Suharto.  This initiated a dramatic change in 
Indonesia’s internal politics; and in short time, East Timor 
became an issue.  While the cost in human life and political 
friction was high, East Timor ultimately received the right 
to a referendum supervised by the United Nations.  In 
1999, its people went to the polls to exercise their right to 
self-determination.  Presently under a U.N. mandate, East 
Timor will soon attain independence in accordance with the 
freely expressed desires of its national polis.  On August 30, 
2001, East Timor held its first elections.262 
 
 259 Id.  at 116 (Oda, J., concurring). 
 260 See id. at 202 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); see id. at 262 (Skubiszewski, J., 
dissenting). 
 261 See id. at 105-06. 
 262 East Timor Holds First Free Election Since Winning Independence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at A7. 
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* * * 
The principles of decolonization, the self-determination of 
peoples, and the emerging right to democratic governance 
impute a continuing legitimacy to the State of Tibet and the 
Dalai Lama’s exile government—validated by legal and 
civil, if not yet political, recognition.  This does not, of 
course, translate into an international legal imperative to 
take action to vindicate the Tibetan people’s rights under 
international law.  But the development of recognition 
practices in the post-War era, at a minimum, complicates 
the question of Tibet’s legal status.  Unlike in the case of 
East Timor, legal and civil recognition practices toward 
Tibet remain in conflict with the prevailing political 
recognition practices of states.  For China, this means that 
Tibet continues to be a diplomatic liability; and this itself is 
critical to ensure that the Tibetan people’s rights do not 
atrophy with the passage of time or become obscured by 
fictional historical and legal claims.  Normative recognition 
practices, in short, may fail to compel states to follow suit 
politically, but they do have, in the long term, real influence 
on the public world order. 
Since 1959, debate on the issue of Tibet’s legal status in 
international political fora has been tabled.  China’s 
political and economic power, coupled with its veto power as 
a permanent member of the Security Council, for the time 
being prevent any serious action.263  But as China continues 
to deflect criticism of its human rights practices with 
statements decrying the legacy of Western imperialism and 
colonialism,264 it is, at a minimum, ironic that U.N. member 
states remain hesitant to confront China with its own 
 
 263 Indeed, in the 1959 debates in the General Assembly, India “questioned the 
purpose of debating the situation in Tibet in the United Nations since ‘nobody is 
going to send an army to Tibet or China.’”  INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 2, 
at 61 (citing U.N. Doc. A/PV.834, Oct. 21, 1959, para. 89 (statement of the Indian 
representative)). 
 264 E.g., Statement of Mr. Wang GuangYa, Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC, at 
the Asia Regional Preparatory Meeting for the World Conference Against Racism, 
Teheran, Feb. 19, 2001. 
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practices of colonization in Tibet—and, we should add, East 
Turkestan (Xinjiang) and “Inner” Mongolia. 
To recognize Tibet’s status formally as a de jure state 
under illegal foreign occupation would be unlikely to work 
dramatic improvements in Tibet’s prospects in the short 
term.  Nor, however, would it be likely to exacerbate them.  
At most, it would provoke a vehement rhetorical response 
from China and symbolic retaliation.  But with China under 
international scrutiny for Beijing’s pledge to host the 2008 
Olympic Games, China’s economic need for free trade with 
the United States and European markets, and with its 
WTO membership still precarious, it seems unlikely that 
this minor step would lead China’s present government to 
take drastic measures (e.g., to cut off diplomatic ties or 
sever economic relations); it cannot afford that risk.  And 
appeasement of China’s fiction of territorial sovereignty 
over Tibet, as Tibet’s tragic history for the past half-century 
makes clear, has hardly proven effective.  For as long as the 
international community continues to indulge the fiction 
that Tibet is “part of” China, China’s political elite will 
continue to claim “interference in internal affairs” as a 
shield to fend off criticism of its alleged “ownership” of Tibet 
and scrutiny of its human rights abuses against the Tibetan 
people.  To challenge this fiction will not by itself restore 
Tibet’s sovereignty.  But it will prevent the issue of Tibet’s 
status from vanishing behind the venire of legitimacy 
generated by years of CCP propaganda and international 
acquiescence.  It may therefore prove the first step—and an 
essential predicate—toward vindicating the Tibetan 
people’s right to self-determination. 
It would be misguided to analogize simply East Timor’s 
occupation by Indonesia to Tibet’s occupation by China.  
But the general refusal to recognize Indonesia’s legal right 
to sovereignty over East Timor in the long-term helped to 
validate the East Timorese people’s right to self-
determination.  States could similarly recognize China’s de 
facto effective control over Tibet without, as they do today, 
SLOANE.DOC 2/9/2005  2:00 PM 
186 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 
 
indulging the fiction of its de jure sovereignty and 
legitimacy.  Such a shift in policy toward China’s claim to 
“ownership” of Tibet—i.e., to recognize it as an occupying 
power rather than a legitimate sovereign—may in time 
enable Tibetans to reassert their equally, if not more, valid 
claim to self-determination and national sovereignty.  And 
to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of recognition in 
contemporary international law may help to ensure, more 
generally, that the “self-determination of peoples” does not 
disintegrate into an empty relic of the era of 
decolonization—for assertions of this right, as recent events 
in Kosovo, Chechnya, and elsewhere suggest, remain 
unlikely to diminish of their own accord. 
